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Abstract
Exploiting linear type structure, we introduce a new theory of weak bisimilarity for the π -calculus in which we abstract away not
only τ -actions but also non-τ actions which do not affect well-typed observers. This gives a congruence far larger than the standard
bisimilarity while retaining semantic soundness. The framework is smoothly extendible to other settings involving nondeterminism
and state. As an application we develop a behavioural theory of secrecy in the π -calculus which ensures secure information flow
for a strictly greater set of processes than the type-based approach, while still offering compositional verification techniques.
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1. Introduction
Linearity is a fundamental concept in semantics with many applications to both sequential and concurrent compu-
tation. This paper studies how a linear type structure, close to one coming from Linear Logic [18] and game semantics
[6,28,33], can be used to give a powerful extension of a basic process equivalence, bisimilarity, in the context of the
π -calculus. We use a linear π -calculus introduced in [46], though the framework is adaptable to various type structures
which combine linearity with other elements such as state and nondeterminism. A central idea is that observables, an
underpinning of any behavioural semantics, can be given a radical change by exploiting the linear type structure [8,38].
The resulting bisimilarity is strictly larger than the standard construction while retaining semantic soundness. As an
application we develop a behavioural theory of secrecy which, via semantic means, ensures secrecy for a strictly larger
set of processes than the type-based approach in [26,29].
Let us briefly explain the key ideas of this bisimilarity, using a process encoding of the λ-calculus. We first recall
that the linear π -calculus in [46] can fully abstractly embed λ()×+, the simply typed λ-calculus with unit, products
and sums. The encoding [[M : α]]u for a λ-term M : α in [46] is a typed version of Milner’s encoding [35]. We also
recall that in λ()×+, the following equation is semantically sound:   M1 = M2 : unit for any   M1,2 : unit. In
particular, any term of this type is always equated with its unique constant, which we write . As an example we have
the following equation:
y : unit⇒unit  (y) =  : unit
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If we apply the encoding in [46] to this, we obtain the following two processes:
[[(y)]]u def= !u(c).y(e)e.c [[]]u def= !u(c).c
Here x(y) is an input of y via x, x(y) is an (asynchronous) output of a fresh name y via x, and ! indicates replication.
Thus, the first process, [[(y)]]u, when invoked at u with a continuation c, first asks at y and, after receiving an answer
at e, returns to c; while [[]]u immediately answers at the continuation after the invocation. Because of the obvious
difference in these actions, we know [[(y)]]u ≈ [[]]u where ≈ is the standard weak bisimilarity. However, since the
encoding is fully abstract, the contextual equivalence ∼=π in [46] for the linear π -calculus does equate them. Intuitively,
this is because the linear type structure allows us to abstract away the additional non-τ -actions in the following way:
(i) The action y(e) is typed as an output to replication: thus it just replicates a process in the environment without
affecting it.
(ii) The action e is typed as a linear input: hence it necessarily receives its dual output, neither receiving nor emitting
non-trivial information.
For these reasons, the additional actions in [[(y)]]u never affect the environment in a way well-typed observers could
detect, and are automatically executable, so they behave “as if they were τ -actions”, allowing them to be neglected.
This suggests the following principle of behavioural semantics in linear processes.
Categorise some of the typed actions as “non-affecting”, and abstract away non-affecting actions as if they were
τ -actions.
The type structure plays a crucial role in this principle.
Following [8,17,21,24,44], the linear π -calculus in [46] includes branching and selection, which correspond to
sums in the λ-calculus and additives in Linear Logic [18]. A branching is an input with I -indexed branches of form
x[&i∈I (	yi).Pi], while a selection is an output of form xini (	z)Q. These constructs have the following dynamics:
x[&i (	yi).Pi]|xinj (	yj )Q −→ (ν 	yj )(Pj |Q)
Now consider another equation in λ()×+, which uses sums this time. Let bool
def= unit+unit below
y : bool  case y of {ini () : in1()}i∈{1,2} = in1() : bool
These terms are translated as follows:
[[case y of {ini () : in1()}i∈{1,2}]]u def=!u(c).y(e)e[&1,2.cin1]
[[in1()]]u def=!u(c).cin1
Both processes are equated by ∼=π . Intuitively this is because an input at e in the first process surely arrives (due to
linearity), and whichever branch is selected it leads to the same selection cin1. We can thus augment the previous
principle as follows.
We may abstract away linear branching inputs as far as they lead to the same action in all possible branches.
The precise formulation of this idea is given in Section 2.
1.1. Application of linear bisimilarity
The new bisimilarity can justify the equations mentioned above, as well as many of the general equations over linear
π -terms in [46] which are used for definability arguments (Corollary 5.3 in [46]). As another application, Section 5
discusses a behavioural theory of secure information flow for the π -calculus, which uses a secrecy-sensitive bisimilarity
built on the top of linear bisimilarity. The theory ensures secrecy through semantic means for a strictly larger set of
processes than the type-based theory in [29] (which is already powerful enough to embed representative secrecy calculi
such as [3,43]). For example, the theory can justify the safety of the following λ-term by encoding (H and L are high
and low secrecy levels, respectively)
case yH of {ini () : in1()}i∈{1,2} : boolL
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which is untypable in standard secrecy typing systems, cf. [3,43]. Note this also means that, for any M1 and M2 whose
encodings are linearly and secrecy-wise bisimilar seen from non-H-level (which includes the standard β-η-equality
but much more), the term:
case yH of {ini () : Mi}i∈{1,2} : boolL
is secrecy-wise safe. As a further example, we can justify the semantic safety of the following imperative program via
encoding into processes using a direct extension of secrecy-sensitive linear bisimilarity, as briefly mentioned at the end
of Section 5 (assuming LsH):
if ws then zH :=!xL; yL := 1 else yL := 1
where “!x” denotes the dereferencing (reading) of an imperative variable x. The reasoning framework allows a powerful
labelled transition based secrecy reasoning for a wide range of programming examples exploiting the linear type
structure, with the ease not possible in the contextually based reasoning.
1.2. Summary of contributions
The following summarises our main technical contributions. To our knowledge the present work is the first to
introduce a consistent theory of bisimilarity for the π -calculus which abstracts away non-τ -actions.
1. The introduction of a novel bisimilarity for the π -calculus that exploits the linear type structure. While sound, the
resulting equivalence is strictly greater than the standard weak bisimilarity.
2. The establishment of congruency of linear bisimilarity in typed contexts. One of the technical contributions of the
present work is a proof technique for establishing congruency of linear bisimilarity. The proof is non-trivial due to
the abstraction of non-τ -actions and the use of liveness associated with linearity.
3. An application to secrecy analysis where a secrecy-enhanced version of linear bisimilarity is used for formulating and
analysing secure information flow in the π -calculus [26,29], ensuring secrecy for a strictly greater set of processes
than the type-based approaches in [26,29] while still allowing compositional verification technique.
We also observe that, while the present work concentrates on the pure linear π -calculus, the framework is systematically
extensible to more complex type structures which integrate linearity with nontermination, nondeterminism and state
[29], to which we can use the same proof methods to obtain the corresponding results. Such extensions are briefly
discussed at the end of Section 5.
1.3. Related work
Since the introduction of Linear Logic [18], linearity has been studied in various semantic and syntactic contexts. In
the setting of the π -calculus, linearity and its relationship to contextual equivalences [27] are studied in [34,40,45]. In
each case, it is shown that linearity induces a strictly larger contextual equivalence than the standard bisimilarity. Boreale
and Sangiorgi [11,40] study typed bisimulations in which two processes whose actions are equivalent up to forwarding
of names are equated. Honda and Tokoro [25] study an untyped bisimulation in which visible actions can be ignored
due to asynchronous observables. Hennessy and Rathke [19] study a process equivalence in which certain actions are
ignored due to capabilities assigned to channels via subtyping. While sharing the common orientation towards a larger
equality by a refined treatment of observables, the nature of abstraction offered by the present theory differs from these
works in two aspects. First, the introduced behavioural equivalence allows us to treat visible interactions which do take
place between the process and the environment as if they were internal (silent) actions. Since the use of liveness in linear
actions is essential for this abstraction (as shown by the examples above), it is difficult to apply these existing techniques
to obtain the same effect. The second significance of using linear type structures for a behavioural equivalence is that it
enables precise embedding of semantics of language constructs including functional [8,46], polymorphism [9], control
[30] and imperative ones [29], which is important for applications. This direction may not have been pursued in the
foregoing studies.
In theories of secure information flow, equality over programs play a central role, cf. [2,3,13,20,41]. Sabelfeld
and Sands gave a bisimulation proof method based on denotational approach for proving probabilistic noninterfer-
ence in [41]. Focardi et al. [12,13] present a bisimulation for cryptographic protocols where high-level actions are
abstracted away, preceding the second part of the present work in abstraction of high-level actions. The extension
of the bisimulation [13] is recently applied to analyse timing sensitive information flow of the first-order sequential
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while programs via an encoding into CCS in [14]. In contrast with the present work, [12,13,14] are based on CCS
without using type structure, which limits expressiveness into the first-order languages. As discussed in the literature
of the π -calculus and in the previous paragraph, when we extend a source programming language to the higher-order
functions and procedure-calls, typed bisimulations in the π -calculus become a highly effective tool. In particular, we
can often make the encoding of a programming language into the typed π -calculi semantically faithful, such as fully
abstract [8,9,30,46]. In this case, the π -calculus can enable a wide range of uniform reasoning methods, starting from
typing rules to bisimilarity to contextual reasoning. Combination of the bisimulation method in [14] and the present
one based on the linear type structure would be an interesting further study in order to develop the timing sensitive
secrecy for imperative higher-order functions as well as strengthening a formal connection between language-based
and process calculus-based security.
Abadi and his colleagues studied several typing systems and their equivalences for the Spi-calculus and Join
calculi in a series of work, e.g. [1,2,4]. In particular in [1] Abadi establishes a secrecy theorem based on a may-
equivalence by using type information for controlling the interface of the attacker. Abadi, Fournet and Gonthier
[5] also study a process calculus with constructs for authentication and show a full abstraction translation of this
calculus into a Join-calculus. The main difference with [1,2,5] is that we take more abstract approach using linearity
of communication in order to limit the environments of opponent processes without specific security constructors
such as signatures and nonces, and then apply it for information flow analysis by adding simple security levels to
channels. Hennessy and Riely [20] use a secrecy-sensitive may-equivalence for noninterference in the π -calculus.
The present work introduces a theory of bisimilarity based on linearity which is directly applicable to secrecy
of possibly nonterminating programming languages. This line of study is not developed in [1,2,4,5,20]. We also
believe our linear bisimilarity technique can be adapted to advanced security constructs such as cryptography [1,4],
authentication [5] and access controls [20] where linearity is often vital. This would allow to verify more protocols
compositionally. Finally the first two present authors proposed, in [26] (with Vasconcelos) and in [29], type systems
for the π -calculus which ensure secrecy; and a static flow analysis [31] to prove the noninterference theorem of these
type systems. The present paper gives a semantic theory of secrecy, non-trivially extending the syntactic theories in
[26,29,31].
1.4. Outline of the paper
This paper is a full version of [47], with complete definitions, more examples and detailed proofs. The emphasis
is on illustrating, through concrete examples, how the typed linear bisimulation of the π -calculus can be used for
developing and justifying a non-trivial type-based analysis of processes and programming languages with and without
secrecy.
Section 2 briefly reviews the linear π -calculus in [46]. Section 3 introduces linear bisimilarity, whose congruency
proof is given in Section 4. Section 5 discusses an application of the linear bisimilarity to secure information flow
analysis. For details of the syntax and types used in the paper, the reader may refer to [8,46].
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Processes
The π -calculus used in this paper is a subset of the standard asynchronous π -calculus [25,36], which restricts name
passing to bound (private) name passing: only bound, or fresh, names are communicated in interaction. This allows
tighter control of sharing without losing essential expressiveness, making it easier to administer name usage in more
stringent ways. The resulting calculus is sometimes called the asynchronous π I-calculus in the literature [39] and has
the expressive power equivalent to the calculus with free name passing [46]. While the present theory can be easily
extend to the free name passing, the restriction to bound name passing gives a simpler definition of labelled transition
relations, leading to a precise transformation between the π -calculus and the λ-calculus.
Syntactically we restrict an output to the form:
(ν 	y)(x〈	y〉|P) with 	y are pairwise distinct (1)
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where 	y = y1...yn denotes a potentially empty vector, | denotes parallel composition, and x〈	v〉 is an asynchronous
output (or a message). We write the process in (1) as x(	y)P . The dynamics has the following form by the restriction
to the bound output:
x(	y).P | x(	y)Q −→ (ν 	y)(P |Q) (2)
Note “x(	y)Q” indicates that x(	y) is an asynchronous output exporting 	y which are originally local to Q. After
communication, 	y are shared between P and Q. To ensure asynchrony of outputs, we add the following rule to the
standard closure rules for | and (ν x):
P −→ P ′ ⇒ x(	y) P −→ x(	y) P ′
Further, for the generation of the structural congruence used for defining the reduction, the following structural rules
are added to the standard rules, allowing inference of interaction under an output prefix
x(	z) (P |Q) ≡ (x(	z) P )|Q if fn(Q) ∩ {	z} = ∅, (3)
x(	z) (ν y)P ≡ (ν y)x(	z) P if y ∈ {x, 	z}. (4)
where fn(Q) means the set of free names in Q. By these rules, we maintain the same dynamics as in the original
asynchronous calculus.
Another useful construct for typing is branching. Branching is similar to the “case” construct in typed λ-calculi
and can represent both base values such as booleans or integers and conditionals. While binary branching has some
merit, we use indexed branching because it simplifies the description of base value passing. The branching variant of
the reduction (3) becomes:
x[&i∈I (	yi).Pi] | xinj (	yj )Q −→ (ν 	yj )(Pj |Q) (5)
where we assume j ∈ I , with I ( /= ∅) denoting a finite or countably infinite indexing set. Branching constructs of this
kind have been studied in Tyco [44] and other calculi [17,21,24] (the corresponding type structure already appeared in
Linear Logic [18]).
We show a simple example of the reduction with bound output and branching. Henceforth we omit trailing zeros
and null arguments and write x[&iPi] for x[&i ().Pi]. Below the left hand side process represents the natural number 1.
The right-hand side process represents case-statement: it activates the first (resp. second) branch at z if the opponent
is 1 (resp. 2)
! x(y).yin1 | x(y)y[.zin1 & .zin2] −→ ! x(y).yin1 | (ν y)(yin1 | y[.zin1 & .zin2])
−→ ! x(y).yin1 | zin1
Let us present the formal grammar of the calculus below. Below and henceforth x, y, . . . , a, b, . . . range over a
countable set of names
P ::= x(	y).P | x(	y)P | x[&i∈I (	yi).Pi] | xini (	y)P | P |Q | (ν x)P | 0 | !P.
x(	y).P is a unary input (resp. unary output), while x[&i∈I (	yi).Pi] (resp. xini (	y)P ) is a branching (resp. selection).
P |Q is a parallel composition, (ν x)P is a restriction, and !P is a replication. In !P we assume P is either a unary
or branching input. The full definitions of structural equality ≡, given in Appendix A. The reduction relation −→
is generated from the rules in (2) and (5), and the following rules for the replications, closed under output prefix,
restriction and parallel composition (modulo ≡)
!x(	y).P |x(	y)Q−→!x(	y).P |(ν 	y)(P |Q)
!x[&i (	yi).Pi]|xinj (	yj )Q−→!x[&i (	yi).Pi]|(ν 	yj )(Pj |Q)
2.2. Channel types
We first introduce channel types, which are types assigned to channels. Types assigned to processes, called action
type, are then finite maps from names to channel types augmented with causality edges for typed channels. In the
following we introduce the fundamental elements of this type discipline one by one.
Channel types in the linear type discipline use action modes [8,22,26,46] as its essential element. Action modes
prescribe different ways processes interact at channels, and are given as follows.
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↓ Linear input ↑ Linear output
! Linear server ? Client request to !
In the above table, the modes in the left column are input modes while those in the right are output modes.
pi (resp. po) denotes input (resp. output) modes. The dual p of p is given by ↓ =↑, ! = ? and p = p. “↓” mode
is associated with an input (e.g. x in x(y).P ). In more detail, ↓ indicates a linear input, at which an interac-
tion takes place precisely once. Then “!” mode is associated with a replicated input (e.g. x in !x(y).P ), and !
indicates a convergent replication (a replication at which no divergence occurs and, hence, ensures an answer is
returned).
Then the set of channel types is given by the following grammar.
τ ::= τI | τO |  τI ::= (	τO)pi | [&i 	τOi]pi τO ::= (	τI)po | [⊕i 	τIi]po
τI, . . . are called input types, while τO, . . . are called output types. 	τ denotes a vector of channel types. (	τ)pi and
(	τ)po are unary input and output types, respectively, while [&i 	τi]p and [⊕i 	τi]p are branching and selection types.
We sometimes write [	τ1&	τ2]p or [	τ1 ⊕ 	τ2]p for binary branching or selection type. We define τ , the dual of τ , by
dualising the action modes and exchanging ⊕ and & of τ . md(τ ) is  if τ =, else the outermost action mode
of τ .
We define the operator  on channel types as the least commutative partial operation such that:
(1-a) τ  τ =  (md(τ ) = ↓)
(1-b) τ  τ = τ (md(τ ) = ?) τ  τ = τ (md(τ ) = !)
If τ  τ ′ is defined, we write τ  τ ′ and say τ and τ ′ compose.
Clause (1-a) says that once we compose two processes at a shared linear channel, one using it for input and another
for output, then that channel becomes no longer composable. Clause (1-b) says that a server should be unique, to which
an arbitrary number of clients can request interactions.
τ  τ ′ captures how we want composition of processes to be coherent. For example, we shall see !x(y).P | !x(y).Q
is never typed because (τ )!  (τ )! for any τ ; similarly x | x is untyped if x is either linear because ()↑  ()↑.
Following [8,28,46], we assume the following sequentiality constraint, which (together with IO-alternation and
other elements in the linear type structure) comes from game semantics. We state the constraint only for unary types:
for branching/selection types, we require the same constraint for each summand.
(C1) In (	τ)↓, md(τi) = ? for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Dually for (	τ)↑.
(C2) In (	τ)! md(τi) ∈ ? for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n except at most one j for which md(τj ) =↑. Dually for (	τ)? .
(C1) means that a linear input receives names of some clients and can ask back to through them. Dually a linear output
carries names of some servers (which may be considered as data carried in a message). (C2) says a channel of a linear
server includes a unique linear output channel, as well as some channels for querying back servers (the latter may be
considered as arguments of an invocation). A couple of examples of types will be shown in Example 2.1.
2.3. Typing and typed processes
An action type is a finite map from names to channel types together with directed edges between names, where
edges represent causality among channels. Here we explain the basic idea and definitions needed for this paper, leaving
the detailed formal definitions in Appendix B.
In the linear typing discipline, we wish to avoid the deadlock and non-termination. Hence the following process
should be untypable:
P
def= ! b.a | ! a.b (6)
We can easily observe if we compose message a to the above process, then the computation does not terminate.
Formally an action type is a finite acyclic directed graph whose nodes have the form x : τ such that no names occur
twice and each edge is of form x : τ → x′ : τ ′ with either
md(τ ) =↓ and md(τ ′) =↑, or md(τ ) = ! and md(τ ′) = ?
We write A(x) for the channel type assigned to x occurring in A. The partial operator A  B is defined iff channel
types in common names compose and the adjoined graph does not have a cycle. If so, the result is a graph in which
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intermediate edges are taken away (see Appendix B for detailed formal definitions). For example, for the linear inputs
and outputs, we have:
(x : ()↓ → y : ()↑)  (y : ()↓ → z : ()↑) = x : ()↓ → z : ()↑
For the server and client types, assuming τ1’s mode is !, we have:
(x : τ1 → y : τ2)  (y : τ2 → z : τ3) = (x : τ1 → z : τ3), (y : τ2 → z : τ3); and
(x : τ1 → y : τ2)  x : τ1  x : τ1 = x : τ1 → y : τ3
However, to avoid divergence, this operator ensures that processes never exhibit circular dependency in actions. For
example, b : τ1 →a : τ2 and a : τ2 →b : τ1 are not composable, hence the process P in (6) is not typable.
fn(A) and md(A) denote the sets of free names and modes in A, respectively. A  B indicates A  B is defined.
Sequents of the linear typing have the form
 P  A
The rules are given in Appendix 4. The typing system is identical with [46] except that we assume a linear input does not
suppress more than one linear output.1 If  P  A is derivable, we say P is typable with A. For brevity we sometimes
write PA instead of  P  A. Typable processes are often called linear processes. Leaving the formal definitions to
Appendix 4 and [46], we give the examples of typed processes which are enough to read the rest of the paper with
detailed explanations and derivations. The type B in (3) is often used later.
Example 2.1 (Linear processes)
(i) The process which outputs empty vector, x, has typing  x  x : ()↑. The process which inputs empty vector,
x.0, has typing  x.0  x : ()↓. Then we have  x.0|x  x : since ()↑  ()↓ and ()↑  ()↓ =. Note that the
first process, x, can also be typed with x : ()? .
(ii) We shall type the encoding of unit , [[]]u def=!u(c).c, from the introduction, step by step.
1:  0  ∅
2:  c  c : ()↑
3: !u(c).c  u : (()↑)!
Note that at the last step, the channel type c is deleted from action types, since it is bound. Now let τ = (()↑)! .
Then a copy-cat agent, !u(c).x(e)e.c, which copies all information from one channel u to another x, is derived
as follows. After Step 1 and Step 2 above, we have:
3:  e.c  e : ()↓ → c : ()↑
4:  x(e)e.c  x : τ , c : ()↑ (by (e : ()↓ → c : ()↑)/e = c : ()↑)
5: !u(c).x(e)e.c  u : τ → x : τ (by (x : τ , c : ()↑)/c = x : τ )
In the above, the operation A/a means that the result of taking off node a : τ from A.
(iii) Let B = [ ⊕ ]↑. Then we have:
1:  0  ∅
2:  cin1  c : B
3: !u(c).cin1  u : (B)!
After Step 1 and Step 2 above, we derive a copy cat with a boolean type as follows:
3:  cin2  c : B
4:  e[.cin1&cin2]  e : B → c : B
5:  x(e)e[.cin1&cin2]  x : (B)? , c : B
6: !u(c).x(e)e[.cin1&cin2]  u : (B)! → x : (B)?
Note that !u(c).x(e)e[.cin1&.cin1] has the same type as the above process.
1 This condition, which we call unique-answer-per-thread, is essentially the same condition as the one used for sequentialisation in Proposition
5.6 in the full version in [46], and leads to a simpler technical development of the theory without sacrificing expressiveness of the calculus.
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The following properties of typed terms are from [46]. Liveness property (3) means that, in spite of nested, complex
calls and interactions, each client is still guaranteed to receive an answer at a linear output channel. This property will
play an important role for proving the congruency of the bisimulation later.
Proposition 2.2
(i) (subject reduction) If  P  A and P −→ Q then  Q  A.
(ii) (one-step confluence) If  P  A and P −→ Qi (i = 1, 2) then Q1 ≡ Q2 or Qi −→ R (i = 1, 2) for some R.
(iii) (liveness) Let  P  A, x : τ with md(τ ) =↑ and md(A) ⊆ {!,}. Then P −→∗ P ′ such that P ′ ≡ x(	y)R or
P ′ ≡ xinj (	y)R.
2.4. Contextual congruence
In this paper, we are interested in semantics which is disciplined by types. We first define a typed contextual
congruence: in general, if a defined bisimilarity is proved within a contextual congruence, it can be regarded as
a “good” equivalence. A relation R over typed processes is typed when PA11 RPA22 implies A1 = A2. We say a
context is typed if it is inductively constructed by typing rules, starting from a typed hole  [ ]  A (where we say
the hole in C[ ] is typed as  [ ]  A when C[PA] is typable). We write P1RA P2 when PA1 and PA2 are related by
a typed relation R. A typed congruence is a typed relation which is an equivalence closed under all typed contexts.
The contextual congruence ∼=π is the maximum typed congruence satisfying the following condition (B appeared in
Example 2.1):
If P ⇓ix and P∼=x:Bπ Q, then Q ⇓ix (i = 1, 2)
where P ⇓ix means P −→∗ xini (	y)P ′. The relation is maximally consistent in the sense that any addition of equations
leads to inconsistency (i.e. it equates arbitrary pairs of processes) [27, Notation 2.18].
2.5. Typed transitions and bisimulations
The congruence ∼=π may be considered as giving the maximal meaningful way to equate processes. A more restricted
and more tractable equality is obtained using labelled transition. Typed transitions describe the observations a typed
observer can make of a typed process. The typed transition relation is a proper subset of the untyped transition relation:
hence it restricts observability but not computation (i.e. -actions). Let the set of action labels l, l′, . . . be given by the
following grammar:
l ::=  | x(	y) | x(	y) | xini (	y) | xini (	y)
Some notations: bn(l) denotes bound names in l and n(l) is the set of names in l. If l /= , we write sbj(l)
for the initial free name of l. Using these labels, the typed transition, written PA l−→ QB is defined as in Fig.
1. Prefix rules are standard, except we do not allow a linear input action and an output action when there is a
complementary channel in the process. For example, if a process has x : (resp. x : (	τ)! ) in its action type, then
both input and output actions (resp. output) at x should be excluded since such actions can never be observed in a
typed context. The last two rules materialise asynchronous nature of the output in transition. In particular, the last rule
represents the interaction between output at x and input at x in P2 where we need renaming to avoid clash of bound
names.
Using the typed transition, we introduce the standard weak typed bisimilarity, already used in [46]. In the subsequent
section, we shall refine this bisimilarity incorporating the type structure. Below lˆ⇒ denotes the standard abstracted
transition.
Definition 2.3 (Typed weak bisimulation). A typed relation R is a weak bisimulation, or a bisimulation, if PA11 RQA11
implies: whenever PA11
l−→ PA22 then there is a typed transition sequence QA11 lˆ⇒ QA22 such that PA22 RQA22 , as well
as the symmetric case. If PARQA for some weak bisimulation R, we write PA ≈ QA.
N. Yoshida et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 72 (2007) 207–238 215
Fig. 1. Typed transition system.
The induced transition and weak bisimulation ≈ are type-wise and semantically consistent in the following sense.
Proposition 2.4 [46, Section 4]
(i) If  P  A and PA l−→ QB is derivable from Fig. 1 then  Q  B.
(ii) ≈ is a congruent relation.
Corollary 2.5. ≈⊂ ∼=π .
Proof. Since, by Proposition 2.4(2) and by Definition 2.3, ≈ is an action-respecting congruence. 
As indicated in the introduction, ∼=π is strictly greater than ≈. One of the aims of the present work is to fill the gap
between ≈ and ∼=π , at least partially, without losing the ease of reasoning of ≈.
3. Linear bisimilarity
3.1. Categorising actions
Towards the introduction of a formal notion of linear bisimilarity, we first classify types (hence typed actions),
according to the following criteria:
• Whether typable actions affect the environment non-trivially; and
• Whether these actions are guaranteed to take place.
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The former comes from the standard observation predicates used for defining both typed and untyped contextual
congruences [20,27,29,34,35]; while the latter represents a progress (liveness) or availability property of an action at
a channel [40,45,46].
Definition 3.1 (Affecting and enabled types)
(i) τ is affecting iff there exist  P1,2  x : τ and a typed context C[ · ] such that  C[Pi]  u : B, C[P1] ⇓1u and
C[P2] ⇓2u.
(ii) τ is enabling iff  P  x : τ implies P −→∗ P ′ l−→ such that sbj(l) = x. τ is enabled if τ is enabling.
Example 3.2 (Affecting and enabled types)
(i) B, (B)! and ((B)!)↑ are affecting but ((B)!)? and (((B)!)?)↓ are not. It is notable that no τ such that md(τ ) ∈ {?,↓}
is affecting.
(ii) Any τ such that md(τ ) ∈ {↓,↑, !} is enabling, while any τ such that md(τ ) = ? is not. Hence all and only types
that are enabled are those with outermost modes ↓,↑, ?.
As suggested in the above example, we have an easy rule to determine whether a type is affecting or not, based on
the shape of types.
Proposition 3.3. Define Aff as the smallest set of types satisfying the following conditions:
• [⊕i=1,2	τi]↑ ∈ Aff.
• (τ1..τn)↑ ∈ Aff when τi ∈ Aff for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
• (τ1..τn)! ∈ Aff when τi ∈ Aff for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
• [&i=1,2τi1..τini ]! ∈ Aff when τij ∈ Aff for some i and j (i ∈ {1, 2}, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni).
Then τ is affecting iff τ ∈ Aff.
Note that τ such that md(τ ) ∈ {?,↑} is never in Aff by definition. Below and henceforth we say P is prime with
subject x if either (1) P is input-prefixed with subject x or (2) P has form x(y1..yn)	iRi or xini (y1..yn)	iRi where
each Ri is prime with subject yi .
Proof (τ ∈ Aff implies τ affecting). By induction on the generation rules above. We use the following fact: to differentiate
 P1,2  x : τ , we can always choose a context (ν x)(R|[ ]) where R is a prime term with subject x, typed as τ , such
that (ν x)(R|P1) is distinguishable from (ν x)(R|P2). This is a consequence of the Context Lemma (Proposition 5.2 (2)
in [46]: P1∼=πP2 if and only if, for each  R  A, x : B, (ν fn(A))(P1|R) ⇓ix iff (ν fn(A))(P2|R) ⇓ix) and, in addition,
operational reasoning based on the type structure, as noted in [46] for linear processes. The case of [⊕i=1,2	τi]↑ ∈ Aff
is obvious. Of the remaining cases we only present one as the others are similar. Take, for simplicity, (τ )! with τ
affecting. Take the context (ν x)(R|[ ]) which differentiates between  P1,2  x : τ . Now let P ′i def=!u(x).Pi (i = 1, 2).
Clearly  P ′1,2  x : (τ )! . These agents can now be distinguished by (ν u)(u(x)R|[ ]), showing (τ )! is affecting.
(τ affecting implies τ ∈ Aff) We establish the contrapositive by noting that the complement of Aff is generated in a
similar way. 
Remark 3.4. It is worth noting that, in the following technical development, we may as well classify all linear unary
types as affecting, with no change in the resulting bisimilarity. However the behavioural notion of affecting types in
Definition 3.1 indicates linear unary types can be treated as non-affecting actions, allowing a more general treatment.
This semantic understanding motivates the present constructions, here or otherwise, on a uniform basis.
The classification of types given above induces the classification of actions. First, an action annotated with an action
type, say lA, is called a typed action if the shape of l conforms to A. For example, if l = xin1 then lA is a typed action
iff A(x) = B. A is a typed action for an arbitrary A. If l /=  and lA is typed, the type of lA is A(sbj(l)). Then we say:
Definition 3.5 (Affecting and enabled typed actions). lA is affecting if l /=  and the type of lA is affecting; lA is
non-affecting if it is not affecting. Further lA is enabled if l =  or the type of lA is enabled.
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Table 1
Classification of actions
 ↓() ↑() ↓& ↑⊕ ! ?
affecting no no yes no yes yes no
enabled yes yes yes yes yes no yes
Table 1 illustrates how typed actions are classified, writing , ↓(), ↑(), ↓&, ↑⊕, ! and ? for (respectively) the
-action, unary linear input, unary linear output, linear branching, linear selection, replicated unary/branching input,
and its dual output.2
We can now introduce invisibility under linear type structure which dictates the “-like” nature of certain non--
actions in the typed setting. Below and henceforth 
,, . . . range over finite sets of names. fn(l) is the set of free
names in l while bn(l) is the set of bound names in l.
Definition 3.6
(i) (invisible actions) A typed action lA is 
-invisible (
-i.) when either fn(l) ∩ 
 = ∅ or, if not, lA is an output
which is non-affecting.3 If lA is 
-invisible and, moreover, is enabled, then lA is 
-strongly invisible (
-s.i.).
(ii) (abstracted transitions) PA lˆ−→
 QB when either: (1) PA l−→ QB or (2) B = A, Q = P and lA is 
-invisible.
PA ⇒
 QB denotes PA l1...ln−→ QB (n ≥ 0) where each li is strongly 
-invisible; then PA l⇒
 QB denotes
PA ⇒
 l−→
⇒
 QB ; finally PA lˆ⇒
 QB denotes either PA l⇒
 QB or PA ⇒
 QB where l is in-
visible and fn(B) ∩ bn(l) = ∅. If PA ⇒
 QB is induced by PA l1...ln−→ QB , we say the latter underlies the
former.
Note that the standard abstracted transitions are a special case of those defined above. For example, PA lˆ⇒
 QB
means PA
l1..ln−→ lˆ−→

l′1..l′m−→ QB for some 
-strong invisible l1..ln and l′1..l′m; if we restrict all of l1..n and l′1..m to -actions,
and use lˆ−→ instead of lˆ−→
, then we obtain the standard notion of abstracted transition. Note also there may be more
than one sequences of non--actions which underly a given abstracted transition.
3.2. Semi-typed relation and branching closure
The invisibility of non-τ -actions necessitates one technical change in the way bisimulations relate typed processes.
As an illustration, let us go back to the initial example in the introduction. The two typed processes concerned were
!x(c).cA and !x(c).y(e)e.cA with A = x : (()↑)! → y : (()↓)? . After the common initial action, the typing becomes
A, c : ()↑. But y(e)e.cA has an output action (which should and can be abstracted away), then e becomes free in the
residual and appears in its type environment. In summary we have:
!x(c).cA x(c)−→ (!x(c).c | c)A,c:()↑
!x(c).y(e)e.cA x(c)−→ y(e)−→(!x(c).y(e)e.c | e.c)A,c:()↑
Since the action y(e) should be invisible, the last state of the second transition should be related to the last state of the
first transition, which has type A, c : ()↑. Consequently, a bisimulation needs to relate processes with distinct action
types. We formalise such a relation, which generalises the notion of a typed relation.
2 We classify unary linear outputs ↑() as affecting in Table 1 even though they are sometimes not, as is seen from Proposition 3.3. An example is
()↑. See Remark 3.4.
3 We can consistently abstract away linear input at 
. For simplicity and because this may not significantly change the resulting relation, we use
the present definition.
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In the following, by the projection of action type A on a set of names 
, denoted by A
, we mean a subgraph of
A whose free names are restricted onto 
. For example, we have (x : τ → y : τ){y} = y : τ .
Definition 3.7. A relationR on typed processes is semi-typed when PARQB implies that the projections of A and B
on 
 = fn(A) ∩ fn(B) coincide, i.e. A
 = B
. We write PAR
QB if R is semi-typed and fn(A) ∩ fn(B) = 
,
in which case we say PA and QB are related byR at 
. The maximum typed subrelation of a semi-typedR is called
its centre.
Using semi-typed relation, a natural way to define a bisimulation would be as follows: a semi-typed R such that,
whenever PA11 RPA22 with 
 = fn(A1) ∩ fn(A2), we have the following and its symmetric case:
whenever PA11
l−→ QB11 , there is PA22 lˆ⇒
 QB22 such that QB11 RQB22 .
However the following example shows that congruency is lost if we allow branching.
Example 3.8. xinx:B1 and yin
y:B
1 are bisimilar at ∅ in the above definition. Similarly x[&1,2zini] and y[&1,2zini] are
bisimilar at z. However when we compose them in pairs, (xin1|x[&1,2zini]) and (yin2|y[&1,2zini]) are not bisimilar:
in fact these terms can be regarded as, up to redundant reduction, zin1 and zin2, which would not be equated under
any reasonable semantic criteria.
The problem in this example is in the second equation: intuitively, x[&1,2zini] and y[&1,2zini] cannot be equated
because, at the disparate interfaces (here x and y), we should expect anything can happen: thus it is possible, at x, the
first process receives the left selection, while, at y, the second process receives the right selection (which is precisely
what happens in the composition). This indicates that we should say “for all possible branching at disparate channels,
the behaviours of two processes at common channels coincide.” This idea is formalised in the following definition.
Below t, ti , . . . range over sequences of typed transitions. A branching variant of, say, xin1(	y) is xin2(	z) (conforming
to the given typing), taken up to α-equality.
Definition 3.9 (Branching closure). A set {PA ti−→ QBii }i∈I of sequences of typed transitions is 
 branching-closed
(
-b.c.) iff: whenever ti = sls′ (i ∈ I ) with l being a linear branching input such that fn(l) ∩ fn(
) = ∅, there is
tj = sl′s′′ (j ∈ I ) for each branching variant l′ of l.
Accordingly we say {PA lˆ⇒
 QBii }i∈I is 
 branching-closed if there exists a 
 branching-closed set {PA
ti−→
Q
Bi
i }i∈I where PA
ti−→ QBii underlies PA lˆ⇒
 QBii for each i. Similarly for other forms of abstracted transitions.
3.3. Linear bisimulation
We are now ready to introduce a bisimilarity on linear processes which is strictly more general than the standard
weak bisimilarity.
Definition 3.10 (Linear bisimulation). A semi-typedR is a linear bisimulation when PA11 RPA22 with 
 = fn(A1) ∩
fn(A2) implies the following and its symmetric case: wheneverPA11
l−→ QB11 , there is a
branching-closed {PA22 lˆ⇒

Q
B2i
2i }i∈I such that QB11 RQB2i2i for all i ∈ I . The maximum linear bisimulation exists, which we call linear bisimilarity,
denoted ≈L.
Simple examples of (non-)bisimilarity follow. Below and henceforth we omit obvious type annotations, assuming
all processes are well-typed. We often annotate ≈L as ≈x,yL (which follows Definition 3.7) to make intersecting channels
explicit.
Example 3.11 (Linear bisimulations)
(i) x.0 ≈∅L 0 and !x.0 ≈∅L 0
This is because the intersecting channels are ∅, so x is ∅-invisible.
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(ii) x|x ≈xL x ≈xL 0.
Since x occurs twice in x|x, x|x should be typed as  x|x  x : ()? . Then, because ()? is non-affecting output by
Table 1, x is invisible. Hence we can totally ignore action at x.
(iii) x.yin1 ≈yL yin1.
Intuitively this is because an output at x will surely arrive in which case the former process has the same observable
as the latter.
(iv) Because of the lack of branching closure, we have x[&1,2zini] ≈zL y[&1,2zini].
On the other hand, we have x[&1,2zin1] ≈zL y[&1,2zin1] ≈zL zin1.
Intuitively the linear branching actions at x and y surely arrive, and activating either branch gives the same effect
“zin1”. Hence we can ignore the actions at x and y.
Remark. None of terms equated in the above examples are ever equated by the standard typed weak bisimilarity ≈
introduced in § 2.5.
We prove the following main result in the next section.
Theorem 3.12 The centre of ≈L is a congruence.
Since an action of B-type is always visible, we immediately obtain:
Corollary 3.13 The centre of ≈L is a subrelation of ∼=π .
We give simple applications of the linear bisimilarity. Below (1) says processes which are entirely typed with ?-types
are equated with the inaction (pA means md(A) = {p}). (2) says a unique process [[]]u def=!u(c).c which is an encoding
of the unit of the λ-calculi essentially inhabits the action type x : (()↑)! → A which is the encoding of the unit type.
(3) is a general law which eliminates ineffectual intermediate actions and processes: in the left-hand side process,
asking at x and getting information at z is vacuous since the result is the same, hence this part can be completely taken
away.
Proposition 3.14
(i) (innocuous actions, cf. [26]) If  P  ?A then P ≈fn(A)L 0.
(ii) (unit inhabitation)  P  A with A = x : (()↑)! →A0 implies P ≈xL !x(c).c.
(iii) (elimination of call-return) Assume x has a type of mode ?, z has a type of mode ↓, and v has a type of mode ↑.
Ry indicates a process with subject y. Then we have: x(	yz)(	jRyj | z[&i (	ui).P v]) ≈L Pv with {	ui} ∩ fn(P ) =
∅.
Proof. For (1), letR be a semi-typed relation given by:PAR0 iff (i) ⊂ fn(A) and (ii) x ∈  implies md(A(x)) = ?.
Assume PA l−→ QB . If l /=  and sbj(l) ∈  then the type of lA is ?-mode, so lA is -invisible. If not, obviously lA is
-invisible. So in both cases 0 simulates this by the inaction. Since -part of B is identical with that of A, we are done.
For (2), by P ≡!x(c).P ′|R with  R  ?A0, (1) and Theorem 3.12, we can safely ignore R. So assume P ≡!x(c).P ′.
Again by Theorem 3.12 it is enough to show P ′ ≈cL c. Since all actions on both sides are invisible we are done. (3) is
direct from the definition of ≈L. 
We discuss the utility of the equations of the above proposition. They directly help to prove the full abstraction
result of the encoding of λ()×+ in [46], eliminating burdens of a few non-trivial context lemmas in [46].
– Proposition 3.14(1) is used to uniformly translate a typed process P into a more restricted form of processes which
satisfy the sequentiality constraint. “Sequential” means that processes have at most one active thread. For example,
a | a is not sequential, while !b.a(x)x.a(y)y.0 is. Using (1), we can cut off redundant output actions, and pick up
a single trace which leads to the unique answer (see the call-sequence in § 4.4). This property is essential to prove
the full abstraction result in [8,46].
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– Proposition 3.14(2) is used to prove the inhabitation result of λ()×+ with the unit type: if   M : unit in λ()×+
then   M∼= : unit where ∼= is the standard contextual equivalence in λ()×+. This theorem of λ()×+ is proved
as follows:
· First, we prove the type preservation result of the encoding of M [46, Proposition 5.8], i.e. if M has type T , then
[[M]]u has a translation of type T .
· Secondly, we prove the soundness result [46, Corollary 5.2], i.e. if [[M]]u∼=π [[N ]]u in the π -calculus then M∼=N
in λ()×+.
· Now, by the equation of (2), we know any π -term [[M]]u which has a type x : (()↑)! →A0, is equated by [[]]u.
Hence, by the above second item, we can derive M∼=.
– Proposition 3.14(3) can be generally used to eliminate the redundant applications of the encoding of λ()×+. The
second example of the introduction is a special case of this equation. Another example would be:
y : α1 ⇒ · · ·αn ⇒ bool  case yV1...Vn of {ini () : in1()}i∈{1,2}
where we assume Vi is typed by αn. This is equated with in1(). The above term is translated as follows:
!u(c).y(	ve)
(∏
i
[[Vi]]vi | e[&1,2.cin1]
)
where we assume [[Vi]]vi is an encoding of Vi , which is a replicated process with subject vi . This process is equated
with !u(c).cin1 by using (3) and congruency of ≈L.
4. Properties of linear bisimilarity
4.1. Preparation
The purpose of this section is to establish congruency of (the centre of) ≈L. We shall use the following basic
properties of typed transitions. The proofs are straightforward and are omitted. Below in (i, ii), the index of an action
is the least subterm(s) that the action originates from (cf. [8, Appendix F]).
Proposition 4.1
(i) If PA li−→ QBii (i = 1, 2) with l1 =  and l2 /= . Then the indices of these two actions are distinct.
(ii) (confluence) LetPA li−→ QBii (i = 1, 2) such that the indices of these two actions are distinct.ThenQB11
l2−→ RC
and QB22
l1−→ RC for some RC.
(iii) (input availability) Let md(A(x)) ∈ {↓, !}. Then PA l−→ where l is input with subject x. Hence if PA l⇒
 QB
with l input then PA l−→⇒
 QB.
(iv) (strengthening) If lA is -(s.)i. and 
 ⊆  then lA is 
-(s.)i. Hence if PA lˆ⇒ QB and 
 ⊆  with fn(l) ⊂
fn(
), then PA lˆ⇒
 QB.
(v) (weakening) Let PA l−→ and x ∈ fn(P ) ∪ . Then if lA is -(s.)i, then lA is  · x-(s.)i. Hence if PA lˆ⇒ QB
and x ∈ fn(P ) ∪ , then PA lˆ⇒·x QB.
(vi) (disjointness) PA ≈L QB for any PA, QB such that fn(A) ∩ fn(B) = ∅.
4.2. Bisimulation over unary processes
We first summarise a property of linear bisimulation over unary processes, i.e. processes without branching or
selection, in this subsection. This offers a useful building block for our later technical development.
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Let us denote the set of unary processes in the linear π -calculus by P(), and use ≈L() for the linear bisimilarity over
P(). In P(), we do not have to consider Definition 3.9, hence we can justify generality of Definitions 3.1, 3.5 and 3.6.
Studying the linear bisimulation on P() is interesting for a couple of reasons: first linear bisimulation coincides with
an observational congruence ∼=π on P(), which shows that our definition for abstractions works sufficiently on this
subset. Secondly, the linear bisimulation fully relates to the intuition of a simply typed λ-calculus with unit-type –
we can coinductively reason the equality of two terms M∼=N in the λ-calculus via the encoding into the π -calculus.
In the following, A1  A2 means A1 = A2 where  = fn(A1) ∩ fn(A2).
Proposition 4.2. Let  Pi  Ai (i = 1, 2) such that A1  A2. Then PA11 ≈L() P A22 .
Proof. We show the set of such pairs is a bisimulation. First we note that PA l−→ QB implies A  B. Take PA11
and PA22 as above and let 
 = fn(A1) ∩ fn(A2). Let PA11
l−→ QB11 . If l is invisible this is emulated by inaction. If
l is visible, then (by P1 being unary) l is an replicated input at 
, with B1 = A1, C for some C. By A1  A2 and
Proposition 4.1(iii), we know PA22
l−→ QA2,C1 . Since A1, C  A2, C, we are done.
Using this lemma, it is easy to prove the compatibility of ≈L() under all typed operators since  -related processes
always result in  -related processes by each typed operation (for example, if  Pi  Ai and  Qi  Bi with Ai  Bi ,
A1  A1 and B1  B1, then we have  P1 | Q1  A1  B1,  P2 | Q2  A2  B2 and (A1  B1)  (A2  B2)).
Hence we have:
Corollary 4.3
(i) Let  Pi  A (i = 1, 2). Then PA1 ≈L() P A2 .
(ii) ≈L() is a congruence over P(), and ≈L() = ∼=π in P().
By the Corollary, we know that any two unary processes of the same type are semantically equal. This is rem-
iniscent of the following property of a simply typed λ-calculus: any two terms of a type generated from the unit
type by applying the function space and the product zero or more times, are semantically equal (which in turn
corresponds to the fact that all objects generated from a final object by product and exponentiation are again
final). In fact, this triviality of inhabitants of unit-like types in the simply typed λ-calculus is a direct consequence
of the congruency of ≈L, the existence of its fully abstract encoding into the linear π -calculus, and Corollary
above.
4.3. Congruency of ≈L (1)
As seen in Example 3.11, Proposition 4.2 is not valid in the full calculus (e.g. xin1 ≈L xin2). The proof for a closure
of the full calculus is non-trivial due to the strong invisibility and branching-closure. First, we state the following lemma
related to the branching-closedness.
Lemma 4.4
(i) (concatenation) Assume {P lˆ1⇒ P ′k} and {P ′k
lˆ2⇒ P ′′jk } are -b.c. Then {P
lˆ1·lˆ2⇒ P ′jk } are -b.c.
(ii) (split) Assume {P ⇒ Pk l−→ P ′k ⇒ P ′′kj } is -b.c. Then {P ⇒ Pk} and {P ′k ⇒ P ′′kj } are -b.c.
(iii) (restriction) {PA lˆ⇒
·x QBii } is 
 · x-b.c. with sbj(l) = x and md(A(x)) ∈ {!,} iff {(ν x)PA/x lˆ⇒
 (ν x)
Q
Bi/x
i } is 
-b.c.
Proof. (i) Obvious by definition.
(ii) Suppose {P ⇒ Pk l−→ P ′k ⇒ P ′′kj } is -b.c. Assume towards a contradiction that {P ⇒ Pk}k∈K is not a 
branching-closed. SupposeP
lk,1...lk,n−→ Pk underlinesP ⇒ Pk . Then there is a transition sequenceP lk+1,1...lk+1,n−→ Pk+1
such that lk+1,m is a branching variant of lj,m for some 1 ≤ m ≤ n and j ∈ K . But this contradicts the assumption that
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{P ⇒ Pk l−→ P ′k ⇒ P ′′kj } is branching-closed. We can similarly prove branching-closure of {P ′k ⇒ P ′′kj } for
each k.
(iii) Mechanical by the definition of l−→. 
Now we show that ≈L is transitive on its centre.
Proposition 4.5 (Transitivity). Suppose PA11 ≈L PA22 and PA22 ≈
L PA33 such that fn(A1) ∩ fn(A3) =  ∩ 
. Then
P
A1
1 ≈∩
L PA33 .
Proof. The proof uses Proposition 4.1(iv) and Lemma 4.4(i). We show the generated relation to be a bisimulation.
Let PA11 ≈L PA22 and PA22 ≈
L PA33 s.t. fn(A1) ∩ fn(A3) =  ∩ 
. Let PA11
l−→ QB11 . By assumption and by Lemma
4.4(i):
{PA22
l1···ln−→ lˆ−→

l′1···l′m−→ QB2i2i } with QB2i2i ≈L QB11
where each of li and l′j is strongly 
-invisible. Again by assumption:
{PA33
lˆ1⇒ .. lˆn⇒ lˆ−→ lˆ
′
1⇒ ..
ˆl′m⇒ QB3ik3ik } with Q
B3ik
3ik ≈L Q
B2i
2i
Note that this is again
-b.c. by Lemma 4.4 (i). We now observe that, by Proposition 4.1(iv), strongly-invisible actions
involved in each of lˆi⇒ and
lˆ′j⇒ are all strongly  ∩ 
-invisible. Similarly li and l′j are (strongly 
-invisible hence)
strongly  ∩ 
-invisible. Thus we know
{PA33 lˆ⇒∩
 Q
B3ik
3ik } with Q
B3ik
3ik ≈L Q
B2i
2i
as required. 
Remark 4.6. Proposition 4.5 does not hold in general if the side condition on free names in the statement (which
comes from the renaming theory over processes in [23]) is taken off. In the light of theory in [23], we may as
well require semi-typed relations to be renaming-closed, in which case this side condition is not restrictive when,
for example, we compose two semi-typed relations. The theories [22,23] also gives a basic framework for treating
composability of two typed processes related by (semi-typed) linear bisimilarity, which is implicit in the following
technical development.
Since ≈L is immediately reflexive and symmetric, it is an equivalence relation. We can also show ≡⊂≈L by
checking each equation. For example (ν x)(P | Q) ≈L (ν x)P | Q with x ∈ fn(Q), follows from Proposition 4.1(iv,v).
For compatibility, closure under prefixes is easy. For restriction, by Lemma 4.4(iii), we can immediately show:
Proposition 4.7 (Restriction). Let PA11 ≈·xL PA22 with md(A(x)) ∈ {, !}. Then (ν x)PA1/x1 ≈L (ν x)PA2/x2 .
4.4. Congruency of ≈L (2): Parallel composition
Suppose we wish to prove the relation:
R def= {(P1 | Q1, P2 | Q2) | P1 ≈ P2, Q1 ≈ Q2} (7)
is a bisimulation up to restriction [36], in order to show that ≈ is closed under parallel composition |. In one of the
trivial cases, we assume
P1 ≈ Q1 (8)
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and
P1 | Q1 l−→ P ′1 | Q1. (9)
Then by (8) and (9), we have
P2
lˆ⇒ P ′2 ≈ P ′1, (10)
hence we easily have:
P2 | Q2 lˆ⇒ P ′2 | Q2 s.t. P ′1 | Q1 R P ′2 | Q2. (11)
However, due to strong invisibility, this standard reasoning method does not work for ≈L, even in this usually trivial
case. We illustrate this point using an example. Recall the following two examples from the Introduction:
P1
def=!u(x).xin1 (12)
P2
def=!u(x).y(e)e.xin1. (13)
Then we know P1 ≈L P2 because y(e) and e are both invisible, so we have
P1
u(x)−→uy P ′1 def= xin1 | P1 (14)
and
P2
u(x)⇒uy P ′2 def= xin1 | P2 (15)
with P ′1 and P ′2 being bisimilar. Suppose we compose them with Q
def=!y(e).Q0 for some Q0 such that P1 | Q and
P2 | Q are typable. Then we have
P1 | Q u(x)−→uy P ′1 | Q, (16)
while we cannot have:
P2 | Q u(x)⇒uy P ′2 | Q, (17)
because the only possible transition is
P2 | Q u(x)−→ −→ (ν e)(e.xin1 | Q0) | P2 | Q. (18)
Note that, in order to reach P ′2
def= xin1 | P2 from the process above, its subprocess e.xin1 needs an acknowledgement
e from Q0, making the application of the standard reasoning impossible.
To solve this issue, we use a liveness property which extends the results given in Proposition 2.2(iii): if Q0 has a
linear output type at e, then there always exist a finite sequence of strong invisible transitions to emit e and which lead
to a semantically equal process, i.e. Q0
e⇒uy Q′0 and Q0 ≈L Q′0.
In the following we define such a chain, called call-sequence. Let us assume P l1·l2⇒ Q. We write: l1bl2 (l1 binds
l2) when the subject of l1 is bound by l2 (e.g. x(y)by) and l1pl2 (l1 prefixes l2) when the action l1 is input-prefixed
by l2 (e.g. x(y)pz in x(y).z). Define  =b ∪p. We write  l1 if P l2⇒ Q and P has subterms Q1 and Q2
such that Q1
l⇒ Q′1 and Q2
l·l2⇒ Q′2 with l l2; similarly we define l1 ; we extend this to a chain l1 ∗ l2
and denote it l1 +l2 ([8, Appendix F] gives a detailed definition using occurrences of terms). Then a call-sequence
(c.s.) to l under A has the following shape:
(l0 +) l1bl2 +l3bl4 + · · · +l2n−1bl2npl
where md(lA2k−1) = ? and md(lA2k) =↓.
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Lemma 4.8 (Call-sequence). Let P be typable below.
(i) (permutation) P l−→ l′−→ P ′ with l  l′ implies P l′−→ l−→ P ′.
(ii) (shortest c.s.) Suppose P l⇒ with l output. Then there is a shortest c.s. l1  · · · ln to l such that P l1···ln−→ l−→.
(iii) (extended liveness) Suppose  P  A, e : τ with md(τ ) =↑. Then P ⇒A,e:τ l−→ with sbj(l) = e.
(iv) (branching-closed c.s) Suppose P l⇒ P ′ with l linear output. Then there is 
 branching-closed call sequences
to l such that {P ⇒ Pk} with Pk lk−→ P ′k and sbj(lk) = sbj(l).
Proof. From the following, we sometimes write  as (l, l) explicitly if  is done by interaction between (the indices
of) l and l.
(i) is obvious.
(ii) By (i), we know there is a shortest transition sequence P l1···ln−→ l−→ such that l1 l2 · · · ln−1 ln l and li is -s.i.
Suppose md(lA) ∈ {?,↑}. Then exactly one of the following must be true: (a) md(ln) =↓ with sbj(ln) ∈ , or (b)
ln = , since if md(ln) = !, then ln is not -s.i. and ln should be input or .
Suppose case (a) holds. Then we have either (1) ln = l1 or (2) ln−1bln with md(ln−1) = ? since by the sequen-
tiality constraint, linear outputs cannot directly carry linear inputs. We then set n = n − 1, and apply the same
routine. Now suppose case (b) holds. Then we have  def= (l′n, ln′) with md(l′n) ∈ {?,↑}. If ln−1 l′n, then we just
repeat the same routine by setting n = n − 1. Suppose ln−1 ln. By input typing rules, ln−1bln. Then obviously
ln−1 =  = (l′n−1, ln−1
′
)bln with ln−1
′
bln. Hence we can use the same routine by setting n = n − 1. We repeat
this procedure until we arrive at n = 1.
(iii) First, given  P  A, e : τ , there always exists a prime  R  B such that B  A and A  B closed. Then by
Proposition 2.2(iii), P | R →→ l−→ with sbj(l) = e. By (i), there is the shortest transitions P l1···ln−→ l−→ such that
l1 l2 · · · ln−1 ln l. By the same reasoning as above, l1 l2 · · · ln−1 ln is a call sequence, so all subjects of
li with md(li) =↓ are bound by li−1 except i = 1. Hence if md(l1) = ?, we are done. So suppose md(l1) =↓. If
sbj(l1) = x ∈ fn(P ), then by definition of , P should have a type x : τ ′ → e : τ . This obviously contradicts the
assumption P is typed by A, e : τ .
(iv) By (ii) and (iii). 
Note (iii) does not restrict the shape of A, cf. Proposition 2.2(iii). Together with (ii), we know there is always a shortest
strongly invisible call sequence to each linear output.
We also use the following lemma. Below (i) is a basic up-to technique. (ii, iii) say ?-actions can be safely neglected.
(iv) essentially says ≈L is closed under injective renaming. (v,vi) say that -actions, replicated inputs, linear outputs
and unary linear inputs can be neglected up to ≈L.
Lemma 4.9
(i) (up to restriction) Let a semi-typed R satisfy that PA11 RPA22 with 
 = fn(A1) ∩ fn(A2) implies the following
and its symmetric case: whenever PA11
l−→ (ν 	x)QB1/	x1 , there is a 
-b.c. closed {PA22 lˆ⇒
 (ν 	x)QB2i /	x2i }i∈I
such that QB11 RQB2i2i for all i ∈ I. Then R is a bisimulation.
(ii) (innocuousness of ?) Suppose  P | Ri  A,Bi where  P  A and  Ri?Ai, Bi with Ai  A (i = 1, 2) and
fn(B1) ∩ fn(B2) = ∅. Then (P | R1)A,B1 ≈L (P | R2)A,B2 .
(iii) (renaming on ?) Suppose  P?A  B and σ is an injective renaming such that dom(σ ) = fn(A) and cod(σ ) ∩
fn(P ) = ∅. Then PAB ≈fn(B)L PσAσB.
(iv) (renaming) Suppose Q ≈
L P and σ is an injective renaming such that (a) dom(σ ) ∩ 
 = ∅, and (b) cod(σ ) ∩
(fn(P ) ∪ fn(Q)) = ∅. Then Q ≈
L Pσ.
(v) (negligible actions) Suppose  P  A and P l−→ P ′ with l =  or md(lA) ∈ {!,↑}. Then P ≈L P ′.
(vi) (linear unary input) Suppose  P  A and P x(	y)−→ P ′ with md(A(x)) =↓ . Then P ≈L P ′.
Proof. See Appendix E.1. 
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In the following lemma, (v) says that if a process moves via a subject which is not in 
, it does not change its
meaning at 
; (vii) says that a 
 branching-closed call sequences in which every branch gives the same answer
(i.e. linear output) can be regarded as a single thread of the standard weak transition, i.e. ⇒.
Lemma 4.10
(i) Let  P  A. Assume P ≈
L Q and P l−→ P ′ where l satisfies either (1) l = , (2) md(lA) ∈ {!,↑} with
sbj(l) ∈ 
, or (3) l = x(	y) and md(lA) =↓ with sbj(l) ∈ 
. Then P ′ ≈
L Q.
(ii) Suppose {P ⇒
 Pj } is 
-b.c and Pj ≈
L Q for all j with 
 = fn(P ) ∩ fn(Q). Then P ≈
L Q.
(iii) Suppose P ≈
L Q and P l−→ P ′ with l = xini (	y) with sbj(l) ∈ 
. Then P ′ ≈
L Q.
(iv) Suppose P ≈
L Q and P l−→ P ′ with md(l) = ? with sbj(l) ∈ 
. Then P ′ ≈
L Q.
(v) Suppose P ≈
L Q and P l−→ P ′ where l is 
-invisible with sbj(l) ∈ 
. Then P ′ ≈
L Q.
(vi) Suppose P ≈
L Q. Assume P l1···ln⇒ l−→ P ′ where l1 · · · ln is a 
-strong invisible call sequence to l such that
sbj(l) ∈ 
. Then P ′ ≈
L Q.
(vii) SupposeP ≈
L Q.Assume {P ⇒
 Pj } is
 branching-closed call sequences, and for all j,we havePj l−→ P ′j
with l linear output. Then Q ≈
L Pj .
Proof. See Appendix E.2. 
Using Lemma 4.10(ii), we can reduce the task of checking a bisimulation closure in linear processes.
Lemma 4.11. SupposeR is a semi-typed relation such that when PA11 RPA22 with 
 = fn(A1) ∩ fn(A2) implies the
following and its symmetric case: whenever PA11
l−→ QB11 , there is a 
 branching-closed {PA22 ⇒

lˆ−→
 QB2i2i }i∈I
such that QB11 RQB2i2i for all i ∈ I. Call such a relation a restricted bisimulation. Then the maximum restricted
bisimulation coincides with ≈L .
Proof. Let
◦≈L be the maximum restricted bisimulation. First, obviously ◦≈L⊆≈L. For the reverse inclusion we show
that ≈L is a restricted bisimulation. Let us assume P1 ≈L P2 and PA11
l−→ QB11 . Then there is a 
 branching-closed
{PA22 lˆ⇒
 QB2i2i }i∈I such that QB11 ≈L QB2i2i for all i ∈ I . First, we can write PA22 ⇒

lˆ−→
 QB2ki2ki ⇒
 QB2i2i by
definition. Then by the Split Lemma (Lemma 4.4(ii)), {QB2ki2ki ⇒
 Q
B2i
2i } is
-b.c. for each ki . Then by Lemma 4.10(ii),
Q
B1
1 ≈L QB2i2i impliesQB11 ≈L Q
B2ki
2ki for each ki . Hence≈L is a restricted bisimulation, that is≈L⊆
◦≈L, as required. 
By the following result, we can further reduce the conditions needed for a bisimulation closure. The reduction comes
from Proposition 4.1(iii)) (input availability) and Lemma 4.10(v). The form of the resulting relation, as stated in the
following proposition, is similar to the branching bisimulation studied in (untyped) confluence processes [37].
Lemma 4.12. SupposeR is a semi-typed relation such that when PA11 RPA22 with 
 = fn(A1) ∩ fn(A2) implies thefollowing and its symmetric case:
• whenever PA11
l−→ QB11 where l is 
-invisible and sbj(l) ∈ 
, then PA22 RQB11 .
• whenever PA11
l−→ QB11 with l input such that sbj(l) ∈ 
, then there is PA22
l−→
 QB22 such that QB11 RQB22 .
• whenever PA11
l−→ QB11 with l 
-visible linear output such that sbj(l) ∈ 
, then there is a 
 branching-closed
call sequences to l {PA22 ⇒

l−→ QB2i2i }i∈I such that QB11 RQB2i2i for all i ∈ I.
• whenever PA11
l−→ QB11 with md(lA1) = ? and sbj(l) ∈ 
, there is a 
 branching-closed call sequence to l,
{PA22 ⇒
 QB2i2i }i∈I , such that either QB11 RQB2i2i or QB2i2i
l−→ Q′2iB
′
2i such that QB11 RQ′2iB
′
2i .
Then the maximum such relation, denoted by
•≈L, coincides with ≈L.
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Proof. By Lemma 4.11, we shall show
•≈L coincides with ◦≈L. Obviously •≈L⊆ ◦≈L. Hence we show ◦≈L⊆ •≈L by showing◦≈L is a (further) restricted form of bisimulation given in Lemma 4.12. Assume P1 ◦≈L P2.
Case 1: Suppose P1
l−→ Q1 where l is  or l is 
-invisible and sbj(l) ∈ 
. By Lemma 4.10(i,v), we always have
P2
◦≈L Q1. Hence by P2 ε⇒ P2, we have P2 ◦≈L Q1.
Case 2: Suppose P1
l−→ Q1 with sbj(l) ∈ 
 and l input, and there is a 
-b.c. {PA22 l⇒
 QB2i2i }i∈I such that QB11
◦≈L
Q
B2i
2i . Then by (permutation) and (input availability), we always have PA22
l−→ PA33 ⇒
 QB2i2i . Then by Lemma 4.10
(ii), PA33
◦≈L PA22 as in the proof of Lemma 4.11.
Case 3: Suppose P1
l−→ P2 with sbj(l) ∈ 
 and l linear output, and there is a 
-b.c. {PA22 l⇒
 QB2i2i }i∈I such
that QB11 ≈L QB2i2i . Then by (permutation) and Lemma 4.8(ii, shortest c.s.), we always have a 
 branching-closed
call-sequence {PA22 ⇒
 R
C2j
2j }j∈J such that R2j
l−→ R′2j ⇒
 QB2i2i . Then we use Proposition 4.10 (ii) as in the
above cases in order to obtain Q1
◦≈L R′2j .
Case 4: Suppose P1
l−→ P2 with l a replicated output. This case is the same as Case 3 above by using (permutation),
Lemma 4.8(ii) and Proposition 4.10(ii).
This exhaust all cases, hence we know
◦≈L⊆ •≈L. 
Lemma 4.13 (Composition). Suppose  P  A and  Qi  Bi with Q1 ≈
 Q2, A  Bi and fn(A) ∩ fn(B1) ⊇
fn(A) ∩ fn(B2) = 
. Moreover the linear output outside of 
 is not suppressed by a linear input at 
. Assume
{P ⇒
 Pk} is
-b.c.Then there exists a
-b.c. {(P | Q1) ⇒
 (ν 	wj)(P ′j | Qj)} such thatQj ≈
L Q2 andP ′j ≈L Pkfor some k.
Proof. See Appendix E.3. 
We are ready to prove the closure under parallel composition.
Proposition 4.14 (Parallel composition). LetPA1 ≈L PA2 andQB1 ≈L QB2 such thatA  B. ThenP1|QAB1 ≈L P2|QAB2 .
Proof. We use the characterisation of ≈L in Lemma 4.12. Let R be generated by
(ν 	w1)(PA11 | QB11 )R (ν 	w2)(PA22 | QB22 )
if and only ifP1 ≈
1L P2, Q1 ≈
2L Q2, 
 = 
1 ∪ 
2, (
 \ 
i) ∩ (fn(Pi) ∪ fn(Qi)) = ∅, { 	wi} = (fn(Pi) ∩ fn(Qi))
\
 such that any linear output outside of 
 is not suppressed by a linear input at 
. We show R is a bisimulation.
First suppose (ν 	w1)(P1 | Q1) l−→ (ν 	w1)(P ′1 | Q1) with P1
l−→ P ′1.
Case 1: Suppose sbj(l) ∈ 
 and l is an input. Then by assumption, we have P2 l−→
 P ′2 ≈L P ′1. Also obviously x :
τ ∈ |A2  B2| with md(τ ) ∈ {↓, !}. Hence by (input availability), (ν 	w2)(P2 | Q2) l−→ (ν 	w2)(P ′2 | Q2), as required.
Case 2: Suppose sbj(l) ∈ 
 and l is invisible. Then by assumption, we have P2 ≈L P ′1. Hence we have (ν 	w2)(P2 | Q2)
ε⇒ (ν 	w2)(P2 | Q2)R (ν 	w1)(P ′1 | Q1).
Case 3: Suppose sbj(l) ∈ 
 and l is a 
-visible linear output. Then by assumption, there exits a 
 branching-
closed call sequence {P2 ⇒
 P ′2i} such that P ′2i
l−→ P ′3i ≈L P ′1. Then by Lemma 4.13, we have a 
 branching-
closed call sequences {(ν 	w2)(P2 | Q2) ⇒
 (ν 	w2′)(P ′′2k | Q2k)} such thatQ2k ≈L Q1,P ′′2k ≈L P ′′2i , andP ′′2k
l−→ P ′′3k .
By Lemma 4.10(ii), P ′′3k ≈L P ′′3i . Hence noting fn(P ′′3k) ∩ fn(P3i ) ∩ fn(P ′1) = fn(P ′′3k) ∩ fn(P ′1), we use transitivity
to obtain P ′′3k ≈L P ′1. Hence (ν 	w2′)(P ′′3k | Q2k)R (ν 	w1)(P ′1 | Q1), as required.
Case 4: Suppose l is a replicated output. This case is similar to the above using Lemma 4.13 again.
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For the condition of suppression, we check that it is maintained during any transition P l−→ P ′ in general. This is
straightforward by the typing rules. For example, suppose PA,x:τ l−→ P ′A,y:τ ′→x:τ with md(τ ′) =↓. By y ∈ bn(l), l
is a replicated output, and obviously y ∈ fn(P ). Hence if x ∈ 
 is not suppressed by the input at 
 from the beginning
as in the assumption of R, it is maintained during any transitions. Hence we are done.
Case 5: If l =  then P ′1 ≈L P1 by Lemma 4.9(v). Hence by transitivity the inaction can simulate this as in Case 2.
Second, if onlyQ1 has an action, this is the same asP1. Finally the case whenP1|Q1 −→ (ν 	w)(P ′1|P ′2) fromP1
l−→ P ′1
and Q1
l−→ Q′1 is the standard reasoning except that we apply the same technique as above for processing additional
invisible actions. Assume, without loss of generality, that l is output. If l is at 
 and this action is not invisible, then
(since its dual input is always possible) we can reason precisely as above. If l is done at 
 but it is invisible, then it is
possible that a subset of the simulating b.c. set abstract away l. In this case, however, the dual action is negligible by
Lemma 4.9(v) and (vi), which gives us the required closure. If l is not at 
 then the closure is immediate using Lemma
4.12. This exhausts all cases. 
Thus we conclude the centre of ≈L is a congruence. Since the observability predicate given in § 2.4 is easily satisfied
by ≈L, we also know ≈L ⊆ ∼=π .
Remark 4.15. The basic framework of the above proof for closure under parallel composition extends to the settings
where we combine such elements as state, nontermination and nondeterminism with linearity (though certain sim-
plification in the proof above is possible due to the pure linear structure, in particular the use of reduced conditions
for bisimulation, given in Lemmas 4.12 and 4.11). The essential properties we need for such proofs is those of call-
sequences, as given in Lemma 4.8. As examples of such combination, the reader may refer to [29]. See also Remark
5.13 at the end of Section 5.
5. Applications to secrecy
In linear bisimilarity, we abstract away non-affecting typed actions as if they were -actions. If we assign a secrecy
level to each channel and stipulate a level of observation, then we can further abstract away those actions which should
not be visible from the stipulated level. For example, from a low-level viewpoint, actions at high-level channels should
be invisible. The technical development of this secrecy enhancement closely follows that of the linear bisimilarity, and
offers a powerful tool for reasoning about secrecy in processes.
Assume given a complete lattice of secrecy levels (s, s′, . . .) with the ordering $. H (the most secret) and L
(the most public) denote the top and bottom of the lattice, respectively. Channel types are annotated with these
levels:
τ ::= τI | τO | s τI ::= (	τO)pis | [&i∈I 	τOi]pis τO ::= (	τI)pos | [⊕i∈I 	τIi]pos
The same constraints as before apply to channel types. In τ , we require each dualised occurrence to own iden-
tical secrecy levels. Action types are given precisely as before, using secrecy annotated types.  P  A (or PA)
is derived by the same rules as in Appendix 4 (the secrecy annotations on types do not affect the derivation of
typing judgements). Let sec(τ ) be the outermost secrecy level of τ . We now apply the idea of “affecting”. We
set:
(i) lA is s-affecting if (1) l is affecting in the sense of Definition 3.5 and (2) when l is a linear selection, we have
sec(A(sbj(l))) $ s.
(ii) lA is s-
-invisible when either fn(l) ∩ 
 = ∅ or, if not, lA is an output which is not s-affecting. If lA is s-
-
invisible and, moreover, is enabled, then lA is s-
 strongly invisible. The abstracted transitions PA ⇒
,s QB ,
PA
l⇒
,s QB and PA lˆ⇒
,s QB and the associated underlying transitions are defined accordingly.
In (1) we only have to count the secrecy level for linear selections because in the linear type structure, no other types
directly emit information. We can now introduce the bisimulation.
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Definition 5.1 (s-bisimulation). A semi-typed relation R is a s-bisimulation when PA11 RPA22 with 
 = fn(A1) ∩
fn(A2) implies the following and its symmetric case: whenever PA11
l−→ QB11 , there is a 
 branching-closed {PA22 lˆ⇒

, sQ
B2i
2i } such that QB11 RQB2i2i . The maximum s-bisimulation exists for each s, which we write ≈s .
By definition, PA ≈L QB implies PA ≈s QB for any s. Further PA ≈H QB implies PA ≈L QB . A simple example
of s-bisimilarity:
Example 5.2 (s-bisimilarity)
– xin1
x:BH ≈H xin2x:BH with Bs = [ ⊕ ]↑s .
In this example, the equation coincides with that of the linear bisimulation without secrecy.
– xin1
x:BH ≈L xin2x:BH
Since xin1 is not L-affective, we can regard this label as an invisible action.
– !a(c).cin1a:τ ≈L !a(c).cin2a:τ with τ = (BH)!s for all s.
Note that the action a(c) is L-affecting, but taking a closure
R =
⎧⎨
⎩
〈(
!a(c).cin1 |
∏
i
ciin1
)⎛⎝!a(c).cin2 | ∏
j
cjin2
⎞
⎠〉
⎫⎬
⎭
we can prove that they are L-bisimilar.
A basic observation on ≈s is that it alone does not form a coherent notion of process equivalence.
Fact 5.3. The centre of ≈s is not closed under parallel composition.
Proof. Take xinx:τ1i (i = 1, 2) with τ1 = BH. Then xin1 ≈L xin2. However if we compose these processes with
x[.uin1&.uin2]x:τ2→u:τ3 where τ2 = τ1 and τ3 = BL, then (ν x)(P1|Q)u:τ3 ≈L (ν x)(P2|Q)u:τ3 . 
The example in the proof above suggests that, for regaining compositionality in ≈s , we need to restrict the set of
processes to those which do not transfer information at some high-level to lower levels. In other words, we require
information flow in processes to be secure. Below we say lA is receiving at s if lA is a linear branching and moreover
sec(A(sbj(l))) = s.
Definition 5.4 (Behavioural secrecy). A set of typed processes S is a secrecy witness if the following holds: whenever
PA ∈ S and PA l−→ QB , we have (1) QB ∈ S and (2) if lA is receiving at s then PA ≈s′ QB for each s′ such that
s $ s′. PA is behaviourally secure iff PA is in some secrecy witness.
Only linear branching counts as “receiving”, which is an exact dual of ≈s (where we consider abstraction by
secrecy levels only for linear selection). Intuitively, a process is behaviourally secure iff, whenever it receives non-
trivial information at some level, it behaves, to a lower-level observer, as if the action had not taken place. Some
examples of (non-)secure processes follow.
Example 5.5. 0∅ is secure. If PA is secure and (ν x)PA/x is well-typed, the latter is secure. If P 	y:	τ ,?A is secure
and !x(	y).P x:(	τ)!→A is well-typed, the latter is secure. Finally, given A def= x : BH →y : BL, x[.yin1&.yin2]A is not
secure but x[.yin1&.yin1]A is secure (the latter is because x[.yin1&.yin1]A ≈yL yinA/x1 ).
The following is proved precisely as Theorem 3.12 except that the use of s-invisibility is compensated by behavioural
secrecy.
Proposition 5.6. The centre of ≈s over behaviourally secure processes is compatible with all operators except linear
branching.
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Proof. The essence of the proof is the same as that of Proposition 4.14, using the corresponding properties. The only
difference is in the following points: assume, as in the proof of Proposition 4.14, that (ν 	w1)(P2|Q2) simulates an
action by (ν 	w1)(P1|Q1).
(i) When only P1 has an action, we simply replace all statements “
-invisible” and “
-visible” with “s-
-invisible”
and “s-
-visible”, respectively. Using the corresponding lemmas, the same reasoning gives the required results.
(ii) When P1 and Q1 interact, it is possible that, say, P1 has a linear selection which can be neglected at level s. Then
P2 may not simulate this action, but it is compensated by Q1 not changing its semantics by the receiving action
up to ≈L: thus P2|Q2 can simulate this action by the inaction, resulting in the same closure.
The second case crucially uses behavioural secrecy. 
Combined with a secure version of the linear branching rule,4 Proposition 5.6 offers a framework for fully compo-
sitional reasoning about secrecy in linear processes. Via embeddings, it can be used for analysing secrecy for λ-terms
[3] and, with extensions to the type structure, for sequential and concurrent imperative programs [10,42,43].
To investigate the relationship with the type-based approach in [29], we introduce tamp(A) (the lowest possible
effect level of A) and ∼=s (a secrecy-sensitive contextual congruence), both from [29].
Definition 5.7 (Tamper level, [29]). The tamper level of τ , denoted tamp(τ ), is defined as follows. We assume
	τ = τ1..τi ..τn and 	τi = τi1..τij ..τini .
(i) tamp(τ ) = H if τ is not affecting.
(ii) tamp((	τ)↑s ) = %i tamp(τi), tamp([⊕i 	τi]↑s ) def= s, tamp((	τ)!s) def= %i tamp(τi),
tamp([&i 	τi]!s) def= %ij tamp(τij ).
Then we set tamp(A) def= %{tamp(τ ) | x : τ occurs in A for some x} .
Observe tamp(τ ) = H whenever τ is not affecting.
Definition 5.8 (Secrecy-sensitive contextual equality). For each s, s-contextual congruence ∼=s is defined as the
maximum typed congruence satisfying the following condition:
If P ⇓ix and P∼=x:Bs′π Q with s′ $ s, then Q ⇓ix (i = 1, 2)
Proposition 5.9. All secrecy typing rules in Appendix 4 are valid when typability is replaced with behavioural
secrecy. Securely typed linear processes are a proper subset of behaviourally secure linear processes.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of typing judgements in the secure typing system of Appendix 4. The only
non-immediate case is (Bra↓). Let the behavioural security of Pi be witnessed by Si(i ∈ I ). Define
S = {x[&i ( 	yi)Pi]} ∪
⋃
i∈I
Si .
To see that S is a secrecy witness it is clearly sufficient to show that R ∪ ≈s is an s-bisimulation where R is given
by: x[&i ( 	yi)Pi]A R PBi for all i ∈ I . Clearly R ∪ ≈s is semi-typed. Let 
 = fn(A) ∩ fn(B). If
x[&i ( 	yi)Pi] l−→ Pj where l = xinj ( 	yj ),
fn(l) ∩ 
 = ∅, because x /∈ fn(B). So l is s-
 strongly invisible. This means that PBj
lˆ−→ PBj and hence PBj lˆ⇒
,s
PBj for all j ∈ I . But {PBj lˆ⇒
,s PBj }j∈I is 
 branching-closed and, by assumptions, Pj ≈s Pk for all j, k ∈ I , so
we have indeed found a matching set of transitions.
4 Given  Pi  Ci where Ci = 	yi : 	τi ,↑A-x , ?B-x (i = 1, 2), the rule requires that, in the antecedents, PCii ≈s′ P
Cj
j
for any s′ such that s $ s′,
in order to conclude that  x[&i (	yi ).Pi ]  (x : [&i 	τi ]↓s→A),B.
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Conversely, if PAii
l′−→ QB then x[&i ( 	yi)Pi] ⇒
,s Pj for all j ∈ I by the s-
 strong invisibility of l. As Pj ≈s
Pi , we can find 
 branching-closed sets {Pj lˆ
′⇒
,s Qjk}j,k∈I . Using Lemma 4.4(i) {x[&i ( 	yi)Pi] ⇒
,s Pj lˆ
′⇒
,s
Qjk} is a matching 
 branching-closed set of transitions.
As an illustration of how to deal with the remaining rules, we now consider (Par). Assume  Pi  Ai ∈ Si(i = 1, 2)
and define
S = {(ν 	x)(Q1|Q2)B | QBii ∈ Si}.
Assume that (ν 	x)(Q1|Q2) l−→ R. Induction on the derivation of that transition has essentially two cases. The first is
this one
Q1
l−→ Q′1
Q1|Q2 l−→ Q′1|Q2
...
(ν 	x)(Q1|Q2) l−→ (ν 	x)(Q′1|Q2)
By (IH), Q′1 ∈ S1 and Q1 ≈s′ Q′1 whenever s $ s′ and l is receiving at s. Hence (ν 	x)(Q′1|Q2) ∈ S and, repeatedly
using Proposition 5.6, (ν 	x)(Q1|Q2) ≈s′ (ν 	x)(Q′1|Q2) whenever l is receiving at s and s $ s′.
The other case, communication between Q1 and Q2, is dealt with just as straightforwardly. 
Proposition 5.9 allows us to consistently integrate the secrecy typing of [26,29] and the present behavioural theory,
for the secrecy analysis in processes and, via embedding, in programs. For example, given a λ()×+-term MN , we can
check the secrecy of [[M]]m by typing, [[N ]]n by behavioural secrecy, and finally verify their combination using typing.
Another consequence of Proposition 5.9 is a simple proof of the following noninterference result, first given in [29].
We first start from the following lemma.
Lemma 5.10. Assume that  P1,2  A and tamp(A) $ s then PA1 ≈s PA2 .
Proof. We define
R = {(PB,QC) | B  C, tamp(Bfn(B) ∩ fn(C)) $ s}.
Clearly R is semi-typed. To see that it is an s-bisimulation let (PB,QC) ∈ R, PB l−→ P ′B ′ where x is the subject
of l. Let 
 = fn(B) ∩ fn(C). If x /∈ fn(C) then l is 
-invisible and hence s-
-invisible. Then QC lˆ−→ QC and thus
QC
lˆ⇒
,s QC . Clearly this transition is also 
 branching-closed. Easily, B ′  C. But because the name we loose
in the transition, x, is not in fn(C) and the new ones we import by l are fresh P ′B
′ RQC , as required. If x ∈ fn(C) we
must distinguish two cases.
– If l is an output, then it is s-
-invisible. The reason for this depends on whether l is linear or not. In the former
case, by assumptions, sec(B(x)) $ s because tamp(B) $ s. In the latter case s-
-invisibility is a consequence of

-invisibility which in turn follows from l being non-affecting. In either case then QC lˆ−→ QC and we can proceed
as in the case above where x /∈ fn(C).
– If l is an input, we use input availability (Lemma 4.1(iii) to infer the existence of a transition QC l−→ Q′C′ ). In this
case easily B ′  C′, i.e. P ′B ′ RQ′C′ , as required. 
Corollary 5.11 (Noninterference). Let P1,2  A be typable by the secrecy typing rules in Appendix 4 and tamp(A) $
s. Then  P1∼=sP2  A.
Proof. By Lemma 5.10 and Propositions 5.9 and 5.6. 
We conclude this section by an example of reasoning about the secure λ-term mentioned in the introduction.
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Example 5.12 (Secrecy via encoding). Let M def= case yH of {ini () : in1()}i∈{1,2}. We show [[M : boolH]]u def=!u(c).
y(e)e[.cin1&.cin1]  u : (BL)! →y : (BH)? is secure. By Proposition 5.6, it suffices to show e[.cin1&.cin1]  e :
BH →c : BL is secure. But this has already been shown in Example 5.5, hence done.
Remark 5.13 (Extensions to other type structures). We have presented a theory of behavioural secrecy focussing
on the pure linear π -calculus. We believe that the framework is systematically expendable to other type structures
which integrate linearity with affinity (nontermination) [8], statefulness (references) [29], control [30], nondeterminism
[29,26] and genericity [9]. In each case, the only necessary extensions are (1) the incorporation of a new s-affecting
action into s-bisimilarity and its dual receiving action into behavioural secrecy, and (2) when affinity (nontermination)
is in the type structure, we change Definition 3.1 as follows: B becomes ()↑A (↑A indicates possibly diverging, or
affine, output), and the condition “C[P1] ⇓1u and C[P2] ⇓2u” becomes “C[Pi] ⇓x and C[Pj ] ⇑x with i /= j” (here ⇓x
iff P −→∗ x|P ′ for some P ′, and ⇑x iff not ⇓x). Except for these two changes, Definitions 3.1–5.4 can be used without
change. To elaborate further:
• To extend this calculus to the affine type structures of [8], we first check Definition 3.1, redefined as above. Clearly,
any unary affine output is affecting, hence both unary and branching affine outputs are categorised as affecting in
the same way as linear branching output in Table 1. They are however not enabling, hence affine inputs are not
enabled, unlike linear inputs. At the level of secrecy, this means we abstract away, in ≈s , affine outputs with high
secrecy levels, just as linear selection; dually, affine inputs is taken care of in behavioural secrecy. We also note that
mixing linearity and affinity in a single type structure is easily done consistently, see [29].
• To extend the present theory to non-determinism [26], we add reference agents [29] or, equivalently, recursion [26]
and incorporate stateful replicated inputs/outputs which are given to (in the case of references) “write” actions.
Using Definition 3.1 or its affine version mentioned above, we can show that stateful replicated outputs are affecting
and enabled. The secrecy refinement works as in the previous example. This allows us to infer, via an embedding,
that the following imperative program is behaviourally secure (assuming LsH):
if ws then zH :=!xL; yL := 1 else yL := 1
The encoding of this program, given in [26,29], allows to neglect the low-level “reading” action at x and the high-
level writing at z because they are categorised as (non-stateful) replicated output. On the other hand, the action
at y which is stateful and hence affecting at L, leads to the same effect in both branches so the two branches are
s-bisimilar. This warrants us to conclude that the encoding is behaviourally secure. Equational and operational
correspondence allows to lift this result to the source program, so it must be secure.
Mixing linearity with other type structures (cf. [9,29]) can be done so that we can ensure the same liveness property
for call sequences (Lemma 4.8(iii)) in each extension, which allows us to apply the same proof methods to obtain the
corresponding results such as Theorem 3.12 and Proposition 5.6. Together with full abstraction, the framework offers
a basis for uniform behavioural analysis of secrecy in programming languages.
Apart from secrecy applications, the complete axiomatic characterisation of the contextual equality ∼=π which
strictly includes ≈L would be one of the interesting further topics. For example, the following two terms which are
observationally congruent ∼=π cannot be equated by ≈L since they are not branching-closure
x(x′)x′[ .y(y′)y′[.zin1 & .zin1] & .y(y′)y′[.zin2 & .zin2] ]∼=π y(y′)y′[ .x(x′)x′[.zin1 & .zin2] & .x(x′)x′[.zin1 & .zin2] ]
In fact, this example can be justified by the following general equation in ∼=π which allows a permutation of two actions
at x and y. Below we assume x has the ?-mode and z has the ↓-mode
C[x(	yz)(	jRyj | z[&i ( 	wi).Pi])] = x(	yz)(	jRyj | z[&i ( 	wi).C[Pi]]) (19)
where x ∈ bn(C) and 	wi appear only in Pi . Since interaction with one replicated agent cannot alter what happens in
interactions with another replicated agent, we can permute interactions.
As we discussed in § 3.3, the linear bisimulation can be directly used for justifying most of the key equations for
proving the full abstraction of the encoding of λ()×+ (the simply typed λ-calculus with sums and products) appeared in
[46]. One equation for the completeness of the encoding in [46], however, does use a permutation, which is an instance
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of the above equation in (19). This observation leads to an interesting further topic—the investigation on a relationship
with the studies by Ghani and others [15,16,7] on equations for λ()×+. These works show that the definability of the
contextual equality in λ()×+ is decidable using the sophisticated techniques from term rewriting and logical relations.
The analysis of a correspondence between ≈L with the permutation law in the linear π -calculus and their axioms may
thus lead to an native effective decision procedures for analysing the equivalence of λ()×+ and its security extensions
via the encoding along the line of [46,32]. As the initial step, we may ask the following two questions:
(i) Is there a simple syntactic axiomatisation of ≈L?
(ii) Can the above permutation axiom (perhaps together with other rules on permutation) generate ∼=π on the top of
≈L?
We leave the solution of these problems open.
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Appendix A. Structural equality
The relation ≡ is the least congruence which includes ≡α and the following equations:
P |0 ≡ P P |Q ≡ Q|P (P |Q)|R ≡ P |(Q|R)
(ν x)0 ≡ 0 (ν xy)P ≡ (ν yx)P ((ν x)P )|Q ≡ (ν x)(P |Q) (x ∈ fn(Q))
(xini (	y)P )|Q ≡ xini (	y)(P |Q) if {	y} ∩ fn(Q) = ∅
(ν z)xini (	y)P ≡ xini (	y)(ν z)P if z ∈ {x 	y}
xini (	y)zinj ( 	w)P ≡ zinj ( 	w)xini (	y)P if z ∈ {	y} and x ∈ { 	w}
We omit rules for unary prefixes since they are subsumed by those for branching/selection.
Appendix B. Action types
We first reiterate the definition of action types. An action type, denoted A,B, . . ., is a finite directed graph with
nodes of the form x : τ , such that:
• no names occur twice; and
• edges are of the form x : τ → y : τ ′ such that either (1) md(τ ) =↓ and md(τ ′) =↑ or (2) md(τ ) = ! and
md(τ ′) = ?.
Several notations:
(i) We write x → y if x : τ → y : τ ′ for some τ and τ ′, in a given action type.
(ii) If x occurs in A and, moreover, if for no y we have y → x, then we say x is active in A.
(iii) |A| (resp. fn(A), sbj(A), md(A)) denotes the set of nodes (resp. names, active names, modes) in A.
(iv) We often write x : τ ∈ A instead of x : τ ∈ |A|, and write A(x) for the channel type assigned to x in A.
We introduce the compatibility and composition of action types. We write A  B iff:
– whenever x : τ ∈ A and x : τ ′ ∈ B, τ  τ ′ is defined; and
– whenever x1 →x2, x2 →x3, . . . , xn−1 →xn alternately in A and B (n ≥ 2), we have x1 /= xn.
Then A  B, defined iff A  B, is the following action type.
– x : τ ∈ |A  B| iff either (1) x ∈ (fn(A)\fn(B)) ∪ (fn(B)\fn(A)) and x : τ occurs in A or B; or (2) x : τ ′ ∈ A and
x : τ ′′ ∈ B and τ = τ ′  τ ′′.
– x → y in A  B iff x : τI, y : τO ∈ |A  B| and x = z1 →z2, z2 →z3, . . . , zn−1 →zn = y (n ≥ 2) alternately in
A and B.
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We use the following notations.
• Ax:τ indicates A such that x : τ ∈ A, and A-x indicates A such that x ∈ fn(A).
• 	pA indicates A such that md(A) ⊂ { 	p}.
• A,B denotes the disjoint union of A and B, indicating at the same time fn(A) ∩ fn(B) = ∅.
• The hiding A/	x is the result of taking off nodes with names in 	x from A.
• The prefix x : τ →A adds an edge from a new node x : τ to the nodes in A.
Appendix C. Typing rules
Below we assume ↑A in (In↓) and (Bra↓) is either a singleton or empty (this condition, called “unique-answer-per-
thread”, is used in Proposition 5.6 in the full version in [46])
(Zero) − 0  _ (Par)
 Pi  Ai (i =1, 2) A1  A2
P1|P2  A1A2 (Res)
 P  Ax:τ md(τ ) ∈ {, !}
 (ν x)P  A/x
(Weak) P  A
-x md(τ ) ∈ {, ?}
 P  A, x : τ
(In↓)  P  	y : 	τ ,↑A
-x, ?B-x
 x(	y).P  (x : (	τ)↓→A),B (In
! )  P  	y : 	τ , ?A
-x
! x(	y).P  x : (	τ)!→A
(Out) P  C
	y:	τ C/	y =Ax : (	τ)p p ∈ {↑, ?}
 x(	y)P  A  x : (	τ)p
(Bra↓)  Pi  	yi : 	τi,↑A
-x, ?B-x
x[&i (	yi).Pi]  (x : [&i 	τi]↓→A),B
(Bra! )  Pi  	yi : 	τi, ?A
-x
! x[&(	yi).Pi]  x : [&i 	τi]!→A
(Sel) P  C
	y:	τj C/	y =Ax : [⊕i 	τi]p p ∈ {↑, ?}
 xinj (	y)P  A  x : [⊕i 	τi]p
We give a brief illustration of typing rules.
• (Zero) starts from the empty action type.
• (Par) uses  for controlling composition. For example, if P has type x : ()↑ and Q has type x : ()↑, then P | Q
is not typable because ()↑  ()↑.
• (Res) allows hiding of a name only when its mode is  or replicated (so that channels of modes ↑,↓ or ? should
be compensated by their duals before restricted). (Weak) weakens  and ?-nodes since we allow the possibility
of having no action at these channels. Formally the weakening of these nodes is necessary for having subject
reduction.
• (In↓) records the causality from linear input type x : (	τ)↓ to linear output types. The side condition A−x and B−x
ensure linearity (i.e. unique occurrence) of x. (In! ) records the causality from replicated input type to ?-types.
The side condition A−x is required to ensure acyclicity.
• (Out,Sel) essentially composes the output prefix and the body in parallel.
• In (Bra↓, Bra!), each summand should have an identical action type A (except for abstracted channels 	yi : 	τi).
This is similar to the sum type in the λ-calculus and additives in Linear Logic.
See [46] for more examples and explanations.
Appendix D. Secrecy typing
For incremental presentation, we first give the typing rules in which (1) secrecy-level annotated channel types are
used; and (2) no secrecy is incorporated in the rules. Thus the set of typable terms are precisely the same as those given
by Appendix 4, and the secrecy properties (e.g. noninterference) are not ensured. The notations are as before.
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(Zero) − 0  _ (Par)
 Pi  Ai (i =1, 2) A1  A2
 P1|P2  A1A2 (Res)
 P  Ax:τ md(τ ) ∈ {, !}
 (ν x)P  A/x
(Weak) P  A
-x md(τ ) ∈ {, ?}
 P  A, x : τ
(In↓)  P  	y : 	τ ,↑A
-x, ?B-x
 x(	y).P  (x : (	τ)↓s→A),B
(In! )  P  	y : 	τ , ?A
-x
! x(	y).P  x : (	τ)!s→A
(Out) P  C
	y:	τ C/	y =Ax : (	τ)ps p ∈ {↑, ?}
 x(	y)P  A  x : (	τ)ps
(Bra↓)  Pi  	yi : 	τi,↑A
-x, ?B-x
x[&i (	yi).Pi]  (x : [&i 	τi]↓s→A),B
(Bra! )  Pi  	yi : 	τi, ?A
-x
! x[&(	yi).Pi]  x : [&i 	τi]!s→A
(Sel) P  C
	y:	τj C/	y =Ax : [⊕i 	τi]ps p ∈ {↑, ?}
 xinj (	y)P  A  x : [⊕i 	τi]ps
In the pure linear π -calculus, the secrecy of processes is ensured simply by replacing the rule (Bra↓) above by the
following one. Other rules remain the same
(Bra↓) Pi  	yi : 	τi,↑A
-x, ?B-x s $ tamp(A)
x[&i (	yi).Pi]  (x : [&i 	τi]↓s→A),B
We call the resulting set of processes, securely typed processes.
Appendix E. Proofs in Section 4
E.1. Proofs for Lemma 4.9
In the following, we often denote l ≡α l′ if they originates from the same index and ≡ denotes the structure
equivalence (hence P ≡ Q ⇒ P ≈L Q).
(i) Standard.
(ii) Let 
 = fn(A). Assume R = {((P | R1), (P | R2)) | P and Ri as in Lemma 4.9(ii)}. We prove R is a bisimu-
lation using Lemma 4.9(i).
The case P | R1 l−→ P ′ | R1 with P l−→ P ′ is trivial.
The case P | R1 l−→ P | R′1 with R1
l−→ R′1. First, suppose l = x(	y) with md(lA) =↑. Then we have  R′1  A1,
B1/x, 	y : 	τ . Obviously sbj(l) ∈ 
, so l is invisible. Next, since fn(P ) ∩ {	y} = ∅, P and R′1 only share replicated
output names. Set B ′1 = B1/x, 	y : 	τ . Then we can check fn(B ′1) ∩ fn(B2) = ∅. Now by P | R1 ε⇒
 (P | R2), we
have (P | R2) R (P | R′1), as desired. As such, we can easily check if R1
l−→ R′1, l is invisible, and moreover it
satisfies the side condition.
The case P | R1 −→ (ν 	x)(P ′ | R′1) with P
l−→ P ′ and R1 l−→ R′1. Then by definition, md(l) = ! and md(l) = ?.
Let us assume l = a(	x). Then we can write down P ≡ (ν 	w)(!a(	x).P0 | Q) and R1 ≡ a(	x)R01. Hence P | R1 −→≡
(ν 	w)(!a(	x).P0 | Q | (ν 	x)(P0 | R01)). Note that (ν 	x)(P0 | R01) only share ?-names with !a(	x).P0 | Q. By appropriate
renaming onR2, we haveP | R1 ε⇒
 (P | R2) ≡ (ν 	w)(!a(	x).P0 | Q | R′2) and (!a(	x).P0 | Q | R′2)R (!a(	x).P0 | Q |
(ν 	x)(P0 | R01)). Hence by applying (i), we conclude the proof.5
5 While we can use (v) for the case of , the given proof has an advantage in that it is adaptable to the setting where we extend the calculus to the
one with non-determinism and state.
N. Yoshida et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 72 (2007) 207–238 235
(iii,iv) Similar with Proposition 3.14(1).
(v) Case : We show R = {(P, P ′) | P −→ P ′}∪ ≡α is a bisimulation.
Suppose P l−→ R. Then if l =  or indices of two tau actions are distinct, then by Proposition 4.1(i,ii), we know
P
l−→ R′ with R −→ R′RR, as required. If l =  and indices of two tau actions are the same, then R′ ≡α P ′, hence
done.
Next suppose P ′ l−→ R. Since  is strongly invisible, P l⇒ R ≡α R, as required.
Case md(l) = !: Suppose P l−→ P ′. Then we can easily check (P, P ′) is in the relation defined in (ii), by assigning
R1 ≡α 0. Hence done.
Case md(l) =↑: We showR def= {(P, P ′) | P a(	x)−→ P ′}∪ ≈L is a bisimulation. There are two interesting cases. Other
cases are just similar with the case for . Let  = fn(P ) ∩ fn(P ′).
Suppose P a(	x
′)−→ P ′{x′i/xi} where two actions are occurred at the same indices, i.e. P gets different bound names xi
and x′i from the outside. Then we can write down P ′ ≡ (ν 	w)(
∏
i Qi | R) and P ′{x′i/xi} ≡ (ν 	w)(
∏
i Qi{x′i/xi} | R)
with Ri ≡!xi( 	wi).Q′i or !xi[&( 	wij ).Q′ij ]. Then we can apply Lemma 4.9 (ii), defining P def= R, R1 def=
∏
i Qi and
R2
def= ∏i Qi{x′i/xi}. Hence P ′ ≈L P ′{x′i/xi}. Since a is a linear output name, a ∈ fn(P ′), so a ∈ . Thus a(	x) is a 
invisible. Hence by P ′ ε⇒ P ′, we have P ′{x′i/xi}RP ′, as desired.
Suppose P ′ l−→ R for some l. If a(	x) l, then we finish the proof by confluence. So assume a(	x) l. Then obviously
P
a(	x)−→ P ′ l−→ R. We need to show P l⇒ R. Since a is a linear output name, a ∈ fn(P ′), so a ∈ . Thus a(	x) is a
-strong invisible. Moreover P l⇒ R is a -branching closed. Hence by RRR, we have closed this case. The case
aini (	x) is just similar.
(v) We show R def= {(P, P ′) | P a(	x)−→ P ′}∪ ≈L is a bisimulation. Just similar with the case of ↑ above by using
confluence, except the following case, which corresponds to the former case of ↑ above. Suppose P a(	x
′)−→ P ′{x′i/xi}
where two actions a(	x) and a(	x′) are the same indices, i.e.P gets different bound names xi and x′i from the outside. Then
this time, we can write down P ′ ≡ (ν 	w)(∏i Qi | R) and P ′{x′i/xi} ≡ (ν 	w)(∏i Qi{x′i/xi} | R) with Ri ≡ xi( 	wi).Q′i
or xiinj ( 	wj).Q′j . This time we can apply Lemma 4.9 (iii), hence we have P ′ ≈L P ′{x′i/xi}. The rest is the same as
the former case of ↑ above.
Remark E.1. The above lemma does not hold for the branching input. Consider the case P aini (	x)−→ P ′ and P ′ l−→ R
for some l such that a(	x) l. Then by the same reasoning as the linear output case, we have P l⇒ R since the action
aini (	x) is invisible. However this transition is not always branching closed, since we may have P ainj (	x)−→ P ′j
lj−→ P ′′j
with lj = l (i.e. lj is a selection valiant of l).
E.2. Proofs for Lemma 4.10
(i): Suppose  P  A. Assume P ≈
L Q and P l−→ P ′ where l satisfies either (1,2,3) in (i). Then by Lemma
4.9 (v) and (vi), we always have P ≈L P ′. Note, for each case, we can easily verify that 
 ⊆ fn(P ) ∩ fn(P ′) and

 = fn(P ′) ∩ fn(Q), as similar with the proofs in Lemma 4.9 (v) and (vi). Hence by the transitivity, we have Q ≈L P ′,
as required.
(ii): We show R def= {(P, Q) | as in Lemma 4.10 (ii)}∪ ≈L is a bisimulation.
Case 1: Assume P l−→
 P ′ with l not 
-s.i. First, by confluence, Pj l−→ P ′j . Then by assumption, Pj ≈
L Q, there
exists a 
-b.c. such that {Q lˆ⇒
 Qk} with Qk ≈
′L P ′j . We can easily check 
′ def= fn(P ′) ∩ fn(Qk) = fn(P ′j ) ∩
fn(Qk) for each j . Hence P ′RQk for each k, as required.
Case 2: AssumeP ⇒
 Pj def⇔ P l1j ....lnj−→ Pj andP l−→
 P ′ with l ≡α lij for some 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Then by (permutation
lemma, Lemma 4.8(i)),P lij−→⇒
 Pj . Hence by definition of the transition relation, there exists an injective renaming
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σ such that P l−→ P ′ ⇒
 Pjσ with (a) dom(σ ) ∩ 
 = ∅, and (b) cod(σ ) ∩ (fn(P ) ∪ fn(Q)) = ∅. We also note
that {P ⇒
 Pjσ } is a 
-b.c. and Pkσ ≈L Q for each k by Lemma 4.9(iv). Note that 
 = fn(Q) ∩ fn(Pjσ ). Hence
with Q ε⇒ Q, we have P ′RQ, as required.
Case 3: SupposeQ l−→
 Q′. Then by assumption, for all j , we have {Pj lˆ⇒
 Pji}withPji ≈
′L Q′. Then by Lemma
4.4(i), {P ⇒
 Pj lˆ⇒
 Pji} is again 
-b.c. Hence by Pij ε−→ Pji , we have Q′RPji , since the side condition of
names is vacuously satisfied (by 
′ = fn(Pji) ∩ fn(Q′)).
(iii) Suppose P1 l−→ P2 with sbj(l) ∈ 
 and l linear branching input. Then there is a 
-b.c. {PA22 ⇒
 QB2i2i }i∈I
such that QB11 ≈◦L QB2i2i . Then by Lemma 4.10(ii) above, we have QA11 ≈◦L PA22 , as desired.
(iv) Just similar as (iii).
(v) By (i, iii, iv).
(vi,vii): Similarly with (ii) using Lemma 4.8(iv) and Lemma 4.9(iv).
E.3. Proofs for Lemma 4.13
First we can easily check the side condition, “the linear output outside of 
 is not suppressed by the linear input at

”, is always maintained as proved in the end of the proof of Proposition 4.14. Hence we only have to check 
-b.c.
and bisimulation. We assume P , Q1 and Q2 in the following is the same as in (4.13).
Case A: Let {P l1k⇒ Pk}k∈K . Then md(l1k) =↑. Let sbj(lk1) = e.
Case 1: Suppose sbj(l1k) ∈ fn(Q1). Then obviously P | Q1 ⇒
 Pk | Q1, as desired.
Case 2: Suppose sbj(l1k) ∈ fn(Q1). Then we have eitherB1 = e : τ, B ′ orB1 = c : τ ′ → e : τ, B ′ for some c ∈ 
. For
both cases (since c ∈ 
 in the latter case), by Lemma 4.8(iii,iv), we have a 
-branching closed sequences {Q1 ⇒

Q1i}i∈I where
(A) for all i ∈ I , Q1i li−→ Q′1i ≈
L Q2 by Lemma 4.10(vi), and
(B) for all n ∈ I , there exists k ∈ K such that ln = lk1 because {P lk1−→ Pk} is a branching closed.
Let us assume Q1 ⇒
 Q1i def⇔ Q1 l1i ···lni−→ 
 Q1i and sbj(lj ) ∈ 
. Note that, if so, for all j ∈ I , any names in
transitions in Q1 ⇒
 Q1j are not overlapped with 
. Then we have:
(a) {(P | Q1) ⇒
 (P | Q1i )}i∈I is 
-b.c. by (A) above.
(b) for all i ∈ I , there exists k ∈ K such that (P | Q1i ) −→ (Pk | Q′1i ) by (B) above.
(c) for each i ∈ I , {(P | Q1i ) −→ (Pk | Q′1i )} is 
-b.c.
Hence by (a) and (c) above, together with Lemma 4.4(i), {(P | Q1) ⇒
 (Pk | Q′1i )}i∈I is 
-b.c. Then by Lemma
4.10(vi), we have Q′1i ≈L Q1 as required.
Case B: Let {P l2⇒ P ′ l1k−→ Pk} with md(l2) = ? and md(l1k) =↑ with l2bl1k . The case sbj(l2) ∈ fn(Q1) is the
same as above. So suppose sbj(l2) ∈ fn(Q1). Then by (input availability), we always have Q1 l2−→ Q′1 with md(l2) = !
By Lemma 4.8(v), we know Q1 ≈L Q′1. Note that {P | Q1
−→ (ν 	w)(P ′ | Q′1)} is 
-b.c. Set P = Q′1 and Q1 = P ′.
Then by applying the same reasoning as above starting from Q′1 | P ′, we can get a desirable 
-b.c., again using Lemma
4.4 (i).
We can easily observe that Cases A and B can be extended to {P l1···l1k⇒ Pk} if all subjects in call-sequences from Q1
are not overlapped with fn(P ) by Lemma 4.4(i).
Case C: Next suppose subjects in a 
-branching closed sequences {Q1 ⇒
 Q1i}i∈I in Case (A-2) overlapped with
fn(P ). If replicated output names are overlapped, then we can use Lemma 4.8(v) as we proved in Case B. Suppose
a linear input name in {Q1 ⇒
 Q1i}i∈I is overlapped with fn(P ). I.e. Q1
li1···lini⇒ Q1i with li1 linear input with
sbj(li1) ∈ fn(P ). Then by Lemma 4.8(iii, extended liveness), we have P ⇒
 Pm li1−→. Then we can repeat the same
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argument as Case A. Note by (extended liveness), this routine (call sequences from P | Q1) is always finite, so we
finish the proof. 
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